Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
L.V., identified in the opinion as father, appealed from an order terminating his parental rights to his daughter, D.V., who was born in 2010. D.V. was one of three children involved in the dependency proceeding, but her two younger half-siblings had different fathers and were not at issue in the appeal. The Riverside County Department of Public Social Services filed dependency petitions for the children in May 2024. Father was intermittently incarcerated during the proceedings and was denied reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1). He nevertheless appeared telephonically at several hearings, including a jurisdictional hearing continued specifically to give the department time to interview him. After mother’s reunification efforts were unsuccessful, parental rights as to D.V. were terminated in May 2026.
Father’s sole appellate argument was that the department had failed to conduct an adequate inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The department conceded that its inquiry was inadequate, acknowledging inadvertent omissions in the initial inquiry into whether D.V. was an Indian child, and it did not oppose conditional reversal. The appeal was taken from the Superior Court of Riverside County, where Kelly L. Hansen was the judge. The Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, filed its unpublished opinion on November 4, 2026, in docket E088642.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal agreed that conditional reversal was appropriate. It explained that the department’s duty of initial inquiry applies in every dependency case and includes asking the child’s parents, among others, whether the child is or may be an Indian child. The court cited In re J.S. and section 224.2, subdivision (b), for that obligation. It also stated that California law requires the juvenile court to ask participants appearing before it about the child’s potential Indian status under section 224.2, subdivision (c).
The decisive defect was the absence of a record showing that either the department or the juvenile court ever asked father whether D.V. is or may be an Indian child. Relying on In re Dezi C., the court held that this omission warranted conditional reversal of the order terminating parental rights as to D.V. The opinion did not resolve a broader merits dispute about the termination order; father presented only the ICWA inquiry issue, and the department conceded the inadequacy.
The disposition conditionally reversed the termination order and remanded with directions to comply with ICWA’s inquiry provisions and section 224.2, as well as section 224.3’s notice provisions if applicable. If the completed inquiry gives neither the department nor the court reason to know that D.V. is an Indian child, the juvenile court must reinstate the termination order. If the department has reason to know that D.V. is an Indian child, the juvenile court must proceed accordingly. Thus, the reversal requires further ICWA compliance but does not itself permanently set aside the termination outcome.
Key Takeaways
- A dependency department’s initial ICWA inquiry must include asking the child’s parents whether the child is or may be an Indian child.
- The juvenile court also has a statutory duty to ask participants appearing before it about the child’s potential Indian status.
- The record here did not establish that either the department or the juvenile court asked father the required question about D.V.
- Conditional reversal allows the department and juvenile court to complete the required inquiry and any applicable notice process.
- The juvenile court must reinstate the termination order if the completed inquiry provides no reason to know that D.V. is an Indian child, but must proceed accordingly if such reason exists.
Why It Matters
The decision applies the required ICWA inquiry procedures to a termination-of-parental-rights appeal in which the department conceded its inquiry was inadequate. It identifies both the department’s duty to ask parents and the juvenile court’s separate duty to question participants who appear, and it rests the result on the record’s failure to show that either entity asked father about D.V.’s possible Indian-child status.
The conditional disposition preserves a path to reinstating the termination order while ensuring that the outstanding ICWA inquiry is completed first. If neither the department nor the court has reason to know that D.V. is an Indian child, the juvenile court must reinstate the order terminating parental rights, which permanently resolves parental rights on that basis. If the department has reason to know that D.V. is an Indian child, the court must proceed accordingly.