Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Hector Eddin Acosta Najera, a Honduran national, entered the United States on an F-1 student visa in January 2023; the visa expired in August 2024. He is married to a United States citizen and has a three-month-old daughter. A 2023 state-court misdemeanor theft conviction resulted in twelve months’ probation and a $340 fine. The parties treated his detention as governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and respondent did not assert that he was currently subject to a final removal order. A footnote also records an earlier 2004 Border Patrol encounter and a 2005 removal order, followed by the later issuance of the student visa and his permitted entry.
In February 2026, Acosta Najera applied for an I-130 Petition for Alien Relative and an I-485 Application to Adjust Status. He attended his I-485 interview in Salt Lake City on July 14, 2026, and ICE arrested him there. He stated that the arrest was warrantless, and respondent supplied no warrant to the court. An immigration judge held a § 1226(a) bond hearing on September 18, 2026, placed the burden of proof on Acosta Najera, and denied release. He remained detained at California City Detention Facility and proceeded pro se with a habeas petition and a motion for a temporary restraining order.
The Court’s Holding
The court explained that § 2241 authorizes habeas relief for custody violating the Constitution or federal law and provides jurisdiction over challenges to immigration-related detention. Acosta Najera raised multiple claims, including that his arrest and resulting detention at the adjustment interview violated the Immigration and Nationality Act. Respondent argued that detention was authorized by § 1226(a) and that the only warranted relief was a bond hearing under that provision and its regulations.
The court instead applied its decision in Ngugi v. Lyons, which had adopted reasoning from Franco v. Meyer and You, Xiu Qing v. Nielsen concerning arrests at adjustment-of-status interviews. Those decisions found likely success on a claim that such detention violated 8 U.S.C. § 1255. Quoting You, the court reproduced the reasoning that Congress did not intend the adjustment process to become a mechanism for “gotcha” enforcement or to permit ICE to exploit adjustment in service of removal.
Respondent did not address the INA claim or identify a factual or legal distinction from Ngugi, Franco, and You. The court therefore ordered Acosta Najera’s immediate release and enjoined respondent from using the adjustment-of-status process to re-detain him, including at or near a future adjustment interview. It also required respondent to give him a copy of the order upon release and directed the Clerk to close the case, terminate pending motions as moot, enter judgment for petitioner, and serve the detention facility. A footnote expressly left open the circumstances in which he could be detained if he later became subject to an executable final removal order.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted the habeas petition rather than limiting relief to another bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
- Its analysis rested on prior decisions concluding that arrest and detention at an adjustment-of-status interview likely violated 8 U.S.C. § 1255 and the INA.
- Respondent’s failure to address the INA claim or distinguish the cited authorities was central to the court’s stated reasoning.
- The order required immediate release and barred use of the adjustment-of-status process to re-detain Acosta Najera, including at or near future interviews.
- The court did not decide what detention would be permissible if Acosta Najera later became subject to an executable final order of removal.
Why It Matters
The decision applies a developing line of Eastern District of California authority to an arrest at an adjustment-of-status interview and treats the government’s § 1226(a) bond-hearing position as insufficient to answer the statutory challenge. It also shows the practical importance of directly addressing that challenge: the court emphasized that respondent neither engaged with the INA claim nor offered a distinction from the controlling line of cited district-court decisions.
The relief was both release-oriented and forward-looking, but it was not an unrestricted ruling against all future detention. The injunction targeted re-detention through the adjustment process, while the express reservation concerning an executable final removal order defines an important limit on the decision’s scope.