Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michael Harris sued Aberdeen Investments, LLC and Does 1-10 in the Central District of California. He asserts violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and state laws based on alleged accessibility barriers, and he seeks monetary relief and injunctive relief under the ADA. In an in-chambers order, Judge Kenly Kiya Kato reviewed the complaint before any merits ruling. The order does not mention a defense motion. The court concluded that, based on threadbare and boilerplate allegations, it does not appear Harris has constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA.
The order starts from the rule that a court must confirm its jurisdiction as a threshold matter, citing Moore v. Harper. Because Harris seeks forward-looking relief, he must show a substantial risk of future injury that is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by an injunction. Under Murthy v. Missouri, that requires a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. Under Langer v. Kiser and Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, an ADA plaintiff can meet this standard by showing either that he is currently deterred from returning because of a barrier, or that he was previously deterred and intends to return to the noncompliant place of public accommodation.
The Court’s Holding
The court did not finally decide standing. It stated a preliminary view that Harris has not plausibly alleged a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. The pertinent allegation, in paragraph 14 of the complaint, is that he wishes to return and patronize the business but is deterred because his knowledge of the alleged violations prevents him from returning until the barriers are removed. The court called that a boilerplate allegation that does not suffice.
The court added that nothing in the record shows how close Harris lives to the business, how regularly he visits the area, or why he prefers this accommodation over comparable locations. It cited Chapman v. Pismo Food Store, Feezor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., and Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles Acquisition, LLC, along with Lujan's statement that 'some day' intentions without concrete plans do not show actual or imminent injury. It also found that Harris had not sufficiently shown that the barriers pose a real and immediate threat to him because of his particular disability. It concluded that his alleged intent to return is conclusory rather than genuine.
As for disposition, the court ordered Harris to appear at an in-person hearing on November 5, 2026, at 9:30 a.m. in Riverside. There he must show cause why the ADA claim should not be dismissed without prejudice for lack of standing, and he must identify the specific facts establishing Article III standing. The order warns that failure to comply will result in dismissal for failure to prosecute and comply with court orders under Rule 41(b). No dismissal has been entered.
Key Takeaways
- A generic statement that a plaintiff wishes to return but is deterred by known barriers was treated as insufficient to show the real and immediate threat of repeated injury needed for ADA injunctive relief.
- The court identified facts a plaintiff should be prepared to show, including the proximity of his residence to the business, the regularity of his visits to the area, and why he prefers this location over comparable ones.
- This is an order to show cause, not a dismissal: the court gave notice of a preliminary concern and set a hearing, and the ADA claim has not been dismissed.
- The potential dismissal described is without prejudice and addresses only the ADA claim. The order does not decide the merits, the state-law claims, or the request for monetary relief.
- The order expressly warns that noncompliance risks dismissal of the action for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b).
Why It Matters
This minute order shows how a Central District judge is applying the forward-looking standing requirements of Murthy v. Missouri to ADA accessibility suits, together with Ninth Circuit authority on deterrence and intent to return. It signals that formulaic standing paragraphs may draw scrutiny at the pleading stage, before the merits, and that plaintiffs may be required to come to court prepared with concrete facts.
Its weight is limited. It is an unpublished in-chambers order that sets a hearing, makes no final ruling on standing, and binds no other court. Whether Harris can supply adequate facts, and what happens to the remaining claims, will turn on the November 5 hearing and later orders, which are not in the materials reviewed.