Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Priscila Guardado, proceeding pro se, challenged her immigration detention at the Adelanto ICE Processing Center. Respondents allege she is a citizen of El Salvador who entered without inspection. She alleges ICE released her in 1999 and re-detained her on August 7, 2026, when she was paroled from state prison after a conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated. On August 13, 2026, she filed a first Section 2241 petition (Guardado I) asserting procedural due process, substantive due process, and Administrative Procedure Act claims. Respondents acknowledged she appeared entitled to an initial bond hearing under Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 183 F.4th 1160 (9th Cir. 2026). On September 15, 2026, the court granted the petition and ordered an individualized bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
On September 14, 2026, a day before that order, Guardado filed this second Section 2241 petition. It repeated the three claims and added an equal protection claim. On September 22, 2026, an immigration judge held the bond hearing and denied bond, finding her a danger to the community. She reserved the right to appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals, whose deadline was October 22, 2026. Respondents answered that the petition should be denied because the hearing had been provided. Guardado filed no reply but, on October 27, 2026, filed an ex parte application for emergency release.
The Court’s Holding
Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow dismissed the petition without prejudice as a successive petition barred by the abuse of the writ doctrine. He explained that the statutory bar in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) governs Section 2254 petitions, not Section 2241 petitions, but that the Ninth Circuit recognizes the common law doctrine for Section 2241 petitions. Under it, a petition raising grounds that were or could have been raised earlier must be dismissed unless the petitioner shows cause and prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Grounds may be the same even when supported by different legal arguments.
The court found that the procedural due process, substantive due process, and APA claims duplicated Guardado I. The equal protection claim was new in label only. It contained no supporting facts or argument and appeared to rest on the same facts. The court also noted that the due process theory rested on circumstances that existed before the September 15 order. It found no showing of prejudice or miscarriage of justice, and said that the possibility of a different result on a new petition is not enough. It added that no manifest injustice existed because Guardado could seek a bond redetermination before the immigration court under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) based on changed circumstances. Her proper recourse from the Guardado I ruling was an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The court denied the emergency application as moot and directed entry of judgment dismissing the action without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- Section 2244(b) does not govern Section 2241 petitions, but the court applied the common law abuse of the writ doctrine to a successive immigration detention petition.
- A new legal label, such as an unsupported equal protection claim, does not avoid the bar when it rests on the same facts as claims already raised.
- A detainee who received the bond hearing ordered in an earlier habeas case cannot relitigate the same claims merely because the immigration judge denied bond.
- The court identified a bond redetermination under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.19(e) based on changed circumstances, and an appeal of the earlier habeas ruling to the Ninth Circuit, as the proper routes.
- The dismissal was without prejudice. The court did not decide whether the bond denial or the continued detention is lawful.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order in a pro se case. It has no precedential weight, but it shows how a Central District magistrate judge handled a serial detention petition under the court's expedited briefing schedule. The order treats a second petition filed one day before a favorable ruling in the first case as an attempt to relitigate claims. It points the detainee to the first case's appeal path and to the immigration court's bond redetermination procedure.
Several matters remain open. The order does not say whether Guardado appealed the bond denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals, sought a redetermination, or appealed Guardado I. A dismissal without prejudice also leaves the underlying lawfulness of her detention unresolved. Practitioners should note that facts arising after the first ruling, such as changed circumstances, are directed to the immigration court rather than a new habeas filing.