Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
George Jones sued Sunset Orange Investments LLC, Edna's Filipino Cuisine, and Does 1-10 in the Central District of California. He alleges violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and state laws arising from accessibility barriers at a property. He seeks monetary relief and injunctive relief under the ADA.
In a chambers civil minute order dated October 28, 2026, Judge Kenly Kiya Kato raised standing on the court's own review of the complaint. She said the complaint's threadbare and boilerplate allegations meant it did not appear Jones had constitutional standing to seek injunctive relief under the ADA. Citing Moore v. Harper, the court explained that it must resolve jurisdiction as a threshold matter before reaching the merits.
The order set out the governing test. A plaintiff seeking forward-looking relief must show a substantial risk of future injury that is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by an injunction, which requires a real and immediate threat of repeated injury (Murthy v. Missouri). Under Langer v. Kiser, which cites Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports, an ADA plaintiff meets that standard by showing either that he is currently deterred from returning because of a barrier, or that he was previously deterred and intends to return.
The Court’s Holding
The order is not a final ruling and dismisses nothing. It states the court's preliminary view that Jones has not plausibly alleged a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. The court pointed to his allegations that he has reasons for the visits and reasons to want to go back but for the access barriers, and that he would like to continue to frequent the property but is deterred because he has been discriminated against and is aware of barriers. It called these threadbare and boilerplate allegations insufficient.
The court added that nothing in the record shows how close Jones lives to the business, how regularly he visits the area, or why he prefers this establishment over comparable ones. It cited Chapman v. Pismo Food Store on that point, with a cf. citation to D'Lil v. Best Western Encina Lodge & Suites. It also found that Jones had not sufficiently shown that the barriers pose a real and immediate threat given his particular disability. The court concluded that his alleged intent to return appeared not genuine and merely conclusory. It relied on Pier 1 Imports, on Feezor v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (quoting Lujan on 'some day' intentions without concrete plans), and on Strojnik v. Pasadena Robles Acquisition, LLC.
The operative relief is procedural. Jones is ordered to appear at an in-person hearing on November 5, 2026, at 9:00 a.m. in Courtroom 3 in Riverside. He must show why the court should not dismiss his ADA claim without prejudice for lack of standing, and he must identify the specific facts establishing Article III standing. The court warned that failure to comply will result in dismissal for failure to prosecute and comply with court orders under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The record does not show what happened at the hearing.
Key Takeaways
- A court may examine Article III standing on its own and require an ADA plaintiff to justify it before the case goes further.
- Generic statements that a plaintiff has reasons to return, or would like to return but is deterred, were treated as too conclusory to show a real and immediate threat of repeated injury.
- The court looked for concrete facts such as the plaintiff's proximity to the business, the regularity of his visits to the area, and why he prefers this location over alternatives.
- The possible dismissal discussed is without prejudice, so the order does not end the case, and it leaves the state-law claims and the merits unaddressed.
- Ignoring the order exposes the plaintiff to dismissal under Rule 41(b), in addition to the standing problem.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court minute order. It sets no binding precedent and decides no contested issue after briefing. Its value is as an example of how a Central District judge screens ADA complaints for standing. The court relied on Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit authority, and the order applies that authority to the complaint's allegations and does not announce a new rule.
For ADA plaintiffs, the order shows that pleading a bare desire to return and a general sense of deterrence may draw an order to show cause. For defendants, it flags standing as a threshold question that can be raised early. Because the order is preliminary, whether Jones can supply the missing facts, and whether the ADA claim or the related state claims survive, remains open.