Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Osman Mijail Flores Arbizu brought a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 after immigration authorities detained him again. He had previously been released on parole, had complied with his release conditions for more than four years, and alleged that agents took him into custody when he voluntarily appeared for a scheduled check-in. The district court granted the petition on March 17, 2026, ordered his immediate release, and entered judgment in his favor.
Flores Arbizu’s counsel then sought attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). The statute ordinarily requires a fee award to a prevailing party in qualifying litigation against the federal government unless the government’s position was substantially justified or special circumstances would make an award unjust. The government opposed the motion on substantial-justification grounds but did not challenge counsel’s hours, requested enhanced hourly rate, or supporting records. The document is a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations, not a final fee order; the parties have 14 days after service to object.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion and awarding $14,755: 29.5 attorney hours at $500 per hour, plus a $5 filing fee. The recommendation concluded that the government’s prelitigation and litigation positions lacked a reasonable basis in law and fact. Although the government relied on 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) as requiring detention, it did not adequately address Flores Arbizu’s liberty interest, his lengthy compliance after parole, or the constitutional limits on civil immigration detention.
The analysis emphasized that a mandatory-detention statute does not erase procedural due process. Supreme Court decisions recognize that immigration detention authority remains subject to constitutional limits, and the Ninth Circuit had long required adequate procedural safeguards. The recommendation also noted that the Ninth Circuit and several other circuits had concluded that people released into the United States and later detained fall under the discretionary authority in 8 U.S.C. § 1226 rather than § 1225(b)’s asserted mandatory regime. Against that body of authority and the facts of this case, the government did not carry its burden to show substantial justification.
On amount, the judge found 29.5 hours reasonable for intake, briefing the petition and emergency-relief motions, client communications, reviewing the opposition, preparing a traverse, and pursuing fees. The ordinary 2026 EAJA maximum was $258.46 per hour, but counsel sought a $500 special-factor rate. Because the government offered no response to the rate or hours and counsel submitted extensive supporting evidence, the recommendation accepted the requested rate. Payment would be made to Flores Arbizu, unless Treasury determines that he owes no federal debt, in which event payment would go directly to counsel.
Key Takeaways
- The government bears the burden of proving that both the agency action and its litigation position were substantially justified.
- Reliance on an immigration-detention statute does not by itself answer a procedural due process challenge to renewed detention.
- A person’s prior parole, years of compliance, and lack of identified danger or flight concerns can be central to whether renewed detention without a hearing is defensible.
- Fee applicants seeking more than the EAJA cap should document the claimed special factor, their time, and the work performed; an opponent’s failure to contest that evidence can be consequential.
- This recommendation is subject to district-judge review. Objections are due within 14 days after service and ordinarily may not exceed 15 pages without leave and good cause.
Why It Matters
For California immigration practitioners, the recommendation connects the merits of a detention challenge to later fee exposure. A government position may be unreasonable for EAJA purposes when it treats statutory detention language as displacing constitutional safeguards, particularly after parole and sustained compliance. The decision also illustrates the value of developing the factual record about release conditions, check-in compliance, and the absence of changed circumstances.
For fee practice, the ruling is a reminder that the requested rate and hours are separate issues from entitlement. Detailed declarations and billing records supported the application here, while the government’s silence on amount left the evidence unrebutted. Because these are findings and recommendations, practitioners should not describe the $14,755 as a final award unless and until the district judge adopts it.