Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Daniel Dorado, a California state prisoner housed at High Desert State Prison in Susanville and representing himself, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the Southern District of California, together with a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP), on August 13, 2026. The defendants named were the City of San Diego, the County of San Diego, the State of California, a City of San Diego lead detective, and the California Attorney General. According to the order, Dorado claims the defendants violated his civil rights during the investigation and prosecution that led to his convictions, and the conduct allegedly occurred in 2018. These are allegations only; the court did not reach their merits.
Ordinarily a civil litigant must pay the filing fee, which the order puts at $405: a $350 statutory fee plus a $55 administrative fee that does not apply to people granted IFP status. Prisoners face an added hurdle under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), part of the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which bars IFP status for a prisoner who, on three or more prior occasions while incarcerated, brought an action or appeal dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failure to state a claim, unless he is under imminent danger of serious physical injury. The court explained that the style of a prior dismissal does not control; what matters is whether it rested on those grounds, and a court may consult its own dockets and proceedings in other courts.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Todd W. Robinson, after reviewing the court's own dockets, found that Dorado has had at least three prior civil actions dismissed while incarcerated on qualifying grounds. The order notes that other judges of the court had recently reached the same conclusion in orders denying IFP status in Dorado's other cases. It identifies three strikes: (1) Dorado v. Crumb, No. 3:20-cv-1936, where a second amended complaint was dismissed without further leave to amend as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, and for seeking damages from absolutely immune defendants (September 24, 2021); (2) Dorado v. Stephan, No. 3:25-cv-0083, where the complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim with leave to amend (February 25, 2025) and the action was later dismissed for failure to state a claim and failure to prosecute (May 14, 2025); and (3) Dorado v. City of San Diego, No. 3:25-cv-1509, where the complaint was dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a claim (September 24, 2025).
The court also held that the imminent danger exception did not apply. Danger must be ready to take place or hanging threateningly over the plaintiff's head, and it cannot rest on complaints of past injury or generalized fears of future harm. Dorado's claims concern events allegedly occurring in 2018, and the order states he does not attempt to allege any imminent danger.
The court denied the IFP motion, dismissed the case without prejudice for failure to pay the full $405 fee required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), certified under § 1915(a)(3) that an IFP appeal would be frivolous and not taken in good faith, and directed the Clerk to enter judgment and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner with three prior qualifying dismissals cannot proceed IFP unless he plausibly alleges imminent danger of serious physical injury when he filed.
- A dismissal counts as a strike based on its grounds rather than its label, and a court may rely on its own dockets and on prior orders from the same court to identify strikes.
- The imminent danger exception looks to present, ready-to-occur harm; allegations about a 2018 investigation and prosecution do not qualify.
- The dismissal is without prejudice and rests on nonpayment of the fee, so the order does not decide the merits of Dorado's section 1983 claims, and it does not address what would follow if he paid the full fee.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order and has no precedential weight, but it shows how the three-strikes bar operates in practice for a repeat filer. The court resolved the IFP question from its own records and earlier orders in Dorado's other cases, without any defendant needing to raise the issue, and it applied the imminent danger exception narrowly.
Practically, Dorado cannot proceed on this complaint without prepaying the full filing fee, and the certification that an IFP appeal would be frivolous means any appeal would also face a fee barrier. The merits of his claims against the City, County, State, detective and Attorney General remain unaddressed.