Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jane Doe sued Christian Lanng in the Northern District of California. The order also refers to Tradeshift, where both Doe and Lanng worked, as a defendant, although only Lanng appears in the caption. Doe filed three motions, ECF Nos. 86, 87 and 89, and the court noted that none was opposed. In the first, she asked to dismiss her claims against Lanng with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2), while preserving the right to bring a later claim for sexual assault or a similar personal injury against him. As quoted in the order, that reservation applies only if her breach of contract or alternative promissory estoppel claims against Lanng are dismissed. It also applies only to the extent the new claim is distinct from the claims now alleged, does not relate to Tradeshift or the parties' employment there, and alleges neither that Lanng acted in a corporate capacity nor that Tradeshift could be liable.
In the second motion, Doe sought leave to amend her complaint to add claims against Lanng for breach of contract and, alternatively, promissory estoppel. In the third, she sought a protective order allowing her to proceed under a pseudonym because the case involves sensitive details of sexual assaults she alleges. Those details are allegations. The court made no finding that any assault occurred and did not reach the merits of any claim.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted all three motions. On voluntary dismissal, it relied on a Central District of California decision and found no reason to deny dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(2) given the lack of opposition. It did not decide how far Doe's conditional reservation will work. The court stated that it expresses no opinion on the extent to which the assertedly conditional nature of the dismissal will permit future claims. It also quoted a District of Oregon decision observing that a dismissal with prejudice may mean a plaintiff cannot bring the same or related claims in a future action.
On amendment, the court applied Rule 15(a)(2) and the Ninth Circuit's five factors: bad faith, undue delay, prejudice to the opposing party, futility, and prior amendment. Prejudice carries the greatest weight, and the rule is applied with extreme liberality. Because the motion was unopposed and there was no evidence that any factor weighed against amendment, the court granted leave to file a second amended complaint. That pleading is not deemed filed and must be filed by October 23, 2026.
On pseudonymity, the court recognized the normal presumption that parties use their real names and the Ninth Circuit's balancing of the need for anonymity against public access and unfairness to the opposing party. It found that the case involves highly sensitive personal information about the alleged sexual assault and that Lanng, who knows Doe's identity, would not be prejudiced. Doe may proceed pseudonymously. The court also set a case management conference for January 19, 2027 at 2:00 p.m., with an updated joint statement due January 12, 2027.
Key Takeaways
- The court granted dismissal with prejudice of Doe's current claims against Lanng because the motion was unopposed, but it neither approved nor rejected the conditional carve-out for a future sexual assault or personal injury claim.
- Whether Doe may later sue Lanng on a sexual assault theory remains undecided and would have to be resolved if such a claim is ever filed.
- Leave to amend was granted under Rule 15(a)(2) because nothing in the record suggested bad faith, delay, prejudice, futility or repeated amendment, and the second amended complaint is due October 23, 2026.
- Doe may proceed under a pseudonym because the allegations are highly sensitive and Lanng already knows her identity, so he faces no unfairness from the arrangement.
- The order decides no merits question, addresses only claims against Lanng, and leaves the new contract and promissory estoppel claims unadjudicated pending the amended pleading and the January 2027 conference.
Why It Matters
This is a trial-court procedural ruling, not a published appellate precedent, and it applies familiar Ninth Circuit standards on amendment and pseudonymous litigation rather than announcing new law. Its most notable feature is the court's refusal to bless, in advance, a with-prejudice dismissal paired with a reservation of future claims. That leaves the preclusive effect of the dismissal for a later court to decide if Doe files a new claim.
Litigants who combine a with-prejudice dismissal with a reservation of future claims should note that an unopposed motion may be granted without any ruling on whether the reservation is enforceable. The case continues. Doe must file her second amended complaint by October 23, 2026, and the contract and promissory estoppel claims against Lanng have not been tested.