Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anthony J. Davis, a California prisoner proceeding without counsel, filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a 2015 San Mateo County conviction. His conviction became final on November 14, 2017, so AEDPA's one-year limitations period expired on November 14, 2018. On November 9, 2018, he wrote to the court asking for a 30-day extension. The Clerk opened a new action and, on November 21, 2018, sent deficiency notices giving him 28 days, to December 19, 2018, to submit a petition on the proper form and either pay the filing fee or file a complete in forma pauperis application. Davis gave his petition to prison officials on December 21, 2018. Under the mailbox rule the court treated it as filed that day, and on October 15, 2019 it dismissed the petition as untimely.
Davis moved for reconsideration on or about March 20, 2026, more than six years after the dismissal. He contended that the Clerk's notices and a December 31, 2018 internal date shown on the electronic docket extended his filing deadline, that the judge altered court records, and that the judge was biased against him. He also asserted newly discovered evidence of juror, judicial and prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel, and he asked for appointed counsel and a different judge. These were his allegations, and the court found them unsupported. Because the motion came more than a year after judgment and did not claim the judgment was void or satisfied, the court analyzed it under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6).
The Court’s Holding
Judge Tigar denied the motion. Reconsideration requires newly discovered evidence, clear error or manifest injustice, or a change in controlling law, and Davis showed none. The one-year period in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) is a statutory deadline that courts cannot extend by procedural order. The Clerk's deficiency notices were ministerial, not judicial decisions. Their December 19, 2018 date governed only the cure of filing deficiencies, and the December 31, 2018 date on the docket was a nonbinding internal date that allowed for mail delays. The court found no alteration of the notices. It concluded that Davis was confusing those administrative dates with the limitations period. Davis also did not dispute the earlier findings that the period expired on November 14, 2018, that his letter was not a habeas petition, and that his petition was sent on December 21, 2018, about five weeks late.
On the new evidence, the court found that the factual predicates of Davis's claims were known at trial or on appeal, as the transcripts attached to his petition showed. Evidence discovered after dismissal would not make this petition timely, though it might support a new petition. The court warned that a new petition could be second or successive and would need Ninth Circuit authorization under § 2244(b). It noted that Davis appears to have filed a second petition in a separate case and did not decide any question about that filing. The court refused to appoint counsel in a closed case and found no basis for recusal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 144 and 455, because the request rested on Davis's mistaken belief that records were altered. The order reaffirmed that equitable tolling was rejected in the 2019 order, and the case remains closed.
Key Takeaways
- A court cannot extend AEDPA's one-year habeas deadline by procedural order, and a request for more time does not turn a letter into a habeas petition.
- Clerk deficiency notices are ministerial and set deadlines for curing filing defects, not for extending the statute of limitations.
- Internal dates shown on the electronic docket are not official deadlines and do not override court orders or statutes.
- Evidence discovered after dismissal does not make a time-barred petition timely, and a new petition on additional claims may face the second-or-successive gatekeeping requirement.
- A recusal request based on a mistaken belief that records were altered does not show that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned.
Why It Matters
The order is a district-court ruling and is not reported, so it carries no precedential weight. It is still a clear explanation of why clerk notices and docket entries cannot enlarge the AEDPA limitations period. It also shows how hard it is to win Rule 60(b)(6) relief when a motion comes long after a final dismissal and merely repeats a misunderstanding of the original ruling.
The order leaves some questions open. It does not decide whether any new petition is timely or successive, and it does not address the separate second petition Davis appears to have filed. The dismissal of the original petition stands.