Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Plaintiff Daniel Clark sued Experian Information Solutions, Inc. and Citibank, N.A. in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. 2:26-cv-03010-FMO-AYP. On October 16, 2026, the parties filed a joint stipulation asking the court to enter a protective order governing discovery in the action, and United States Magistrate Judge Anna Y. Park signed the resulting order the same day.
The order recites that discovery is likely to involve confidential, proprietary, or private information—including trade secrets, commercial and financial information, and material implicating third-party privacy—for which special protection from public disclosure and from any use other than prosecuting the litigation is warranted. The parties expressly acknowledged that the order confers no blanket protection and that it does not itself authorize filing material under seal.
The order then sets out detailed mechanics: definitions of protected material and the parties covered; a scope provision extending protection to copies, excerpts, summaries, and testimony revealing protected material; designation procedures requiring a 'CONFIDENTIAL' legend; challenge procedures under Local Rules 37-1 through 37-3 with the burden on the designating party; access limited to counsel, parties, experts, court personnel, and others who sign an acknowledgment; rules for subpoenas in other litigation and for non-party material; and post-litigation return or destruction requirements.
The Court’s Holding
The court found good cause and ordered the stipulated protective order into effect: 'FOR GOOD CAUSE SHOWN, IT IS SO ORDERED.' The order protects only information that qualifies under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), and it prohibits mass or indiscriminate designations, exposing unjustified designations to sanctions.
Substantively, the order bars any use of protected material for business, commercial, or competitive purposes or for any purpose other than preparation for and trial of the action. It does not govern use of protected material at trial, and its terms end when trial commences, at which point previously confidential court-filed material becomes presumptively public absent compelling reasons shown to the trial judge under Kamakana v. City and County of Honolulu.
The order also preserves the court's sealing authority: confidential material may be filed under seal only by court order under Civil Local Rule 79-5 on a showing of good cause, and violations of the order may be punished by contempt or monetary sanctions. Because the order was entered on the parties' stipulation, it operates as a binding court order rather than a private agreement.
Key Takeaways
- The court adopted the parties' protective order as a judicial order after finding good cause, so its confidentiality designations are enforceable by the court, not merely by contract between the parties.
- Protection is limited to material that actually qualifies under Rule 26(c); blanket or tactical designations are prohibited and may draw sanctions.
- The order does not authorize sealing: any request to file protected material under seal must separately satisfy Civil Local Rule 79-5 and a court order.
- Confidential designations lapse at the start of trial, when filed material becomes presumptively public unless compelling reasons justify continued sealing.
- After final disposition, receiving parties must return or destroy protected material within sixty days of a written request and certify compliance, though counsel may retain archival copies that remain subject to the order.
Why It Matters
The order illustrates the standard federal discovery framework in the Central District of California: a stipulated Rule 26(c) order can efficiently govern confidentiality, but it deliberately leaves sealing to the stricter Local Rule 79-5 process and distinguishes the 'good cause' standard for discovery material from the 'compelling reasons' standard that applies once merits-related documents enter the court record at trial.
For practitioners, the decision confirms that parties in this district should not treat a protective order as a sealing order, must designate narrowly, and must plan for the return or destruction of protected material after the case ends.