Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Julio Cruz sued Oscar Douglas Mejia and others in the Central District of California. According to the order's description of the complaint, the pleading asserts a claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. section 12131 et seq., along with four state-law theories: California's Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code sections 51 through 53; the California Disabled Persons Act, Civil Code section 54 and following; California Health and Safety Code section 19955 and following; and negligence. The order does not recount any facts about the premises, the alleged barriers, or the defendants' conduct, and nothing in it resolves whether any claim has merit. Those claims remain allegations.
Judge Fred W. Slaughter issued this in-chambers civil minute on October 28, 2026, as Docket Entry 10, with no counsel appearing for either side. The court observed that it possesses only supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a). It then quoted City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997), for the proposition that a federal court deciding whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction should consider and weigh, in each case and at every stage of the litigation, the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.
The Court’s Holding
The order is a procedural show-cause directive, not a ruling on the merits or a final decision on jurisdiction. Citing the Ninth Circuit's decisions in Arroyo v. Rosas, 19 F.4th 1202 (9th Cir. 2021), and Vo v. Choi, 49 F.4th 1167 (9th Cir. 2022), among other authority, the court ordered Plaintiff to show cause in writing why it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The written response is due on or before November 4, 2026, one week after the order. The order does not specify what the response must contain beyond answering that question, and it does not discuss how Arroyo or Vo apply to this complaint.
The court also warned that failure to adequately comply may result in dismissal of the action with prejudice and without further notice, citing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), Link v. Wabash Railroad, 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962), Hells Canyon Preservation Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 689 (9th Cir. 2005), and Ash v. Cvetkov, 739 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984). That is a warning of a possible consequence, not a dismissal. No claim has been dismissed, no state-law claim has been declined, and no judgment has been entered. The order leaves open whether the court will keep the state claims, decline to hear them, or take some other step after reading the response. It also does not address the viability of the federal ADA claim or any defendant's position.
Key Takeaways
- The order is an interim in-chambers show-cause directive, not a ruling on whether the court will keep or decline the state-law claims.
- The court described its authority over the Unruh Act, Disabled Persons Act, Health and Safety Code, and negligence claims as supplemental only, resting on 28 U.S.C. section 1367(a).
- Plaintiff must file a written response by November 4, 2026, explaining why the court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
- The court cited Arroyo v. Rosas and Vo v. Choi as relevant Ninth Circuit authority without applying them in this order.
- Inadequate compliance could lead to dismissal of the action with prejudice under Rule 41(b), which is a warning rather than a decision.
Why It Matters
The order shows a federal district court raising supplemental jurisdiction at the pleading stage in a disability access case that pairs a federal ADA claim with California statutory and tort claims. By quoting the 'at every stage' language from City of Chicago, the court indicates that it treats the decision whether to keep state claims as one it may revisit throughout the case rather than something settled by filing. The reference to Arroyo and Vo tells counsel which Ninth Circuit decisions the court considers relevant, though the order itself does not explain how they apply.
This is an unpublished district court minute order. It is not a Ninth Circuit decision, carries no precedential weight, and binds no other court. Its value is as an example of one judge's practice and of the showing plaintiffs in similar cases should expect to prepare. The plaintiff's response, any later order on the state-law claims, and the final disposition are not part of the materials reviewed, so those questions remain open.