Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Robert Lamont Crossley sued several defendants over civil rights violations he alleged occurred while he was housed at Kern Valley State Prison. The magistrate judge screened the complaint in a Screening Order and found that it stated a cognizable Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Diaz Garcia, Garcia, K. Garcia, Flores, and Lopez in their individual capacities. The magistrate judge also found that Crossley had not stated claims against the defendants in their official capacities, and that the facts alleged were insufficient to state claims for retaliation, failure to protect, due process violations, unreasonable searches, and false disciplinary reports.
After the Screening Order, Crossley told the court he was willing to proceed on the cognizable claims and that the remaining claims could be dismissed. The magistrate judge then issued Findings and Recommendations on September 21, 2026, recommending that the action proceed on the cognizable claims and that all other claims be dismissed. They were served on Crossley with notice that objections were due within 14 days and that failure to object could waive the right to challenge the magistrate judge's factual findings on appeal. On September 26, 2026, Crossley filed a further statement again saying he wished to proceed on the cognizable claims. The order does not describe any objection to the recommendations.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Jennifer L. Thurston performed a de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and concluded that the Findings and Recommendations were supported by the record and proper analysis. The court adopted them in full. The order does not restate the screening analysis; the reasons each claim was found deficient are those in the magistrate judge's earlier filings, which the district court endorsed.
The disposition has three parts. The action proceeds on Crossley's Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against Diaz Garcia, Garcia, K. Garcia, Flores, and Lopez, in their individual capacities only. All other claims raised in the complaint are dismissed. The Clerk of Court is directed to update the docket to terminate the defendants as named in their official capacities.
The order does not say whether the dismissals are with or without prejudice, and it grants no leave to amend. It is not a final judgment, because the excessive force claim remains pending. The dismissal rests both on the court's agreement with the screening analysis and on Crossley's stated willingness to proceed only on the cognizable claim.
Key Takeaways
- The district court adopted the magistrate judge's Findings and Recommendations in full after de novo review under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), finding them supported by the record and proper analysis.
- Only the Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against five named defendants, sued in their individual capacities, survives screening; the order does not decide whether the force alleged was actually excessive.
- Claims for retaliation, failure to protect, due process, unreasonable searches, and false disciplinary reports, along with all official-capacity claims, were dismissed because the magistrate judge found the alleged facts insufficient.
- The order does not specify whether the dismissals are with or without prejudice or permit amendment, so any later attempt to replead those claims is left open.
- Crossley twice said he was willing to proceed on the cognizable claims, and the order records no objection to the recommendations.
Why It Matters
This is a routine but instructive screening-stage order in a prisoner civil rights case. It shows the sequence used in the Eastern District of California: a magistrate judge screens the complaint, the plaintiff states which claims he will pursue, findings and recommendations issue with notice of the 14-day objection period, and the assigned district judge reviews de novo before adopting them. The order is a case-specific procedural ruling that carries no precedential weight.
For the parties, the practical effect is a narrowed case. The five officers must respond only to the individual-capacity excessive force claim, and no other claim or official-capacity defendant remains. Whether the force used was excessive, and whether any defendant is liable, are untouched by this order and remain for later proceedings.