Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Canela Cifuentes Catalan sued in the Central District of California. The defendants included James S. Hill, identified as a warden, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and the Estate of Matthew Sigala. According to the memorandum, the clerk entered default against the Estate, and the district court then dismissed Cifuentes's claims against the Estate. The Estate afterward answered her complaint. The memorandum does not describe the underlying allegations, the stated basis for the dismissal, or the timing of the later motion, so those points remain outside what can be reported here.
Cifuentes moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) for relief from the order dismissing her claims against the Estate. The district court denied the motion, and she appealed. The Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. section 1291 and reviewed the denial for abuse of discretion. The panel, consisting of Chief Judge Murguia, Circuit Judge Johnstone, and District Judge Orrick sitting by designation, decided the appeal without oral argument after submission on October 22, 2026. In her opening brief, Cifuentes argued that relief lay not in Rule 60(b)(1)'s excusable neglect provision but in Rule 60(b)(6), pointing to the Estate's answer after default and dismissal. The appellees separately moved for judicial notice.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It first held that Cifuentes waived any claim to relief under Rule 60(b)(1), because her own opening brief said the proper basis for relief was Rule 60(b)(6) rather than the excusable neglect provision. The panel added that, even if it considered the Rule 60(b)(1) claim, the district court did not abuse its discretion, because the balance of the Pioneer factors supported the district court's decision. It cited Casey v. Albertson's Inc. for affirmance where the length of and reasons for the delay weighed against relief. The memorandum does not walk through the individual factors or identify the length of the delay.
The panel then addressed Rule 60(b)(6), which it described as available only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment. It concluded that the Estate's post-dismissal answer was not such a circumstance, because it did not affect Cifuentes's ability either to prevent an erroneous judgment or to correct one through a timely appeal. The district court had not considered the Rule 60(b)(6) claim, but the panel sustained the denial anyway, relying on Rosales-Martinez v. Palmer, which allows an appellate court to consider an argument raised below in the first instance and to sustain a ruling on grounds the lower court did not address. The court affirmed the denial of the Rule 60(b) motion and denied the appellees' motion for judicial notice as moot. Nothing was remanded.
Key Takeaways
- A litigant who tells the court of appeals in her opening brief that relief lies under Rule 60(b)(6) rather than Rule 60(b)(1) waives the Rule 60(b)(1) claim.
- Even without waiver, the panel indicated that the Pioneer factors, including the length of and reasons for the delay, supported denying excusable neglect relief.
- Rule 60(b)(6) is reserved for extraordinary circumstances that prevented a party from taking timely action to prevent or correct an erroneous judgment.
- An answer filed by a defaulted defendant after dismissal was not an extraordinary circumstance here, because it did not impair the plaintiff's ability to prevent the judgment or appeal it in time.
- An appellate court may sustain a Rule 60(b) denial on a ground the district court did not address, as the panel did here for Rule 60(b)(6).
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished, nonprecedential memorandum, citable only as permitted by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so it binds no later panel. Its practical lesson concerns briefing and timing: a party seeking Rule 60(b) relief should choose and preserve her theory, and should not expect a later step by the opposing side to excuse a missed chance to challenge a judgment through ordinary appeal.
The ruling is also limited. The panel said nothing about the merits of the dismissed claims, whether the Estate's default should have been handled differently, or whether a differently framed motion might have fared better. It decided only that the denial of Rule 60(b) relief was not an abuse of discretion.