California Case Summaries

Cannavan v. Newsom — Dismissals as Merely Duplicative Are Not Strikes Under § 1915(g), So In Forma Pauperis Application Is Granted

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Patrick A. Cannavan v. Gov. Gavin Newsom, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Jennifer L. Thurston (Joe Biden, 2021)
Date Decided
2026-10-14
Docket No.
1:26-cv-07235
Status
Unreported
Topics
in forma pauperis, three strikes, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), duplicative actions, findings and recommendations, Eastern District of California

Background

Patrick A. Cannavan filed a civil rights action in the Eastern District of California against Governor Gavin Newsom and other defendants and applied to proceed in forma pauperis. The order describes the complaint only as alleging violations of his civil rights. It does not set out the underlying claims, and nothing in it resolves their merits.

A magistrate judge reviewed Cannavan's litigation history and issued findings and recommendations dated September 10, 2026. The magistrate judge identified five earlier Eastern District actions against Governor Newsom, each dismissed as duplicative on August 31, 2026, and treated all five as strikes under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). That statute counts a prior dismissal as a strike when it was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. The magistrate judge also found that Cannavan did not satisfy the imminent danger exception and recommended denying the application.

The district judge addressed those recommendations in an order dated October 13, 2026. The order does not mention objections, and this article does not assume that any were filed.

The Court’s Holding

The court declined the findings and recommendations because dismissal as duplicative is not one of the grounds listed in § 1915(g). It acknowledged Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 1995), which found no abuse of discretion in dismissing, under a prior version of the statute, a complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims. But the court explained that Cato did not hold that a duplicative dismissal automatically qualifies as a strike.

Relying on Ray v. Lara, 31 F.4th 692, 697 (9th Cir. 2022), which cites Harris v. Harris, 935 F.3d 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2019), the court applied the Ninth Circuit's narrow reading: a case not dismissed on one of the specific enumerated grounds does not count as a strike. The court acknowledged that a court may find a duplicative action also frivolous or malicious, but it found that no such finding was made in the five cases. Each concluded only that the action was duplicative. Without additional findings of frivolousness or maliciousness, the dismissals do not qualify as strikes. The court cited an Eastern District decision, Ramsey v. Lujan, and a Third Circuit decision, Washington v. Gilmore, as consistent support.

The order therefore declined the September 10, 2026 findings and recommendations, granted the application to proceed in forma pauperis, and referred the matter to the magistrate judge for further proceedings. Because the strike finding failed, the court did not address the magistrate judge's imminent danger conclusion.

Key Takeaways

  • A dismissal labeled only as duplicative does not count as a strike under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) unless the dismissing court also found the action frivolous, malicious, or failing to state a claim.
  • The court read the three-strikes statute narrowly, following Ninth Circuit authority that a dismissal outside the enumerated grounds is not a strike.
  • The district judge declined a magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which remain only recommendations until the district court acts on them.
  • The ruling grants in forma pauperis status only; it does not decide the merits of the civil rights claims or whether the complaint survives screening.
  • The court did not reach the imminent danger exception, and the case returns to the magistrate judge for further proceedings.

Why It Matters

This is a short, unreported district court order, so it has no precedential force beyond this case. Its value lies in applying binding Ninth Circuit authority on § 1915(g) to a common situation: a litigant with several dismissals for duplicating other filings. The court looked to what each dismissal order actually found rather than to the label used in the magistrate judge's summary.

Much remains open. The order does not hold that duplicative dismissals can never count as strikes; it says only that these five lacked findings of frivolousness or maliciousness. It also says nothing about whether the complaint states a viable claim or should be screened out, which is left to the magistrate judge on referral. Granting in forma pauperis status here does not signal any view on those questions.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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