California Case Summaries

Camou v. Borla — Prisoner’s Small-Cell Eighth Amendment Claim Passes Screening, but Retaliation Claims Against Two Officers Are Dismissed With Leave to Amend

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Michael Charles Camou v. Edward Borla, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
Judge
Trina L. Thompson (Joseph R. Biden, 2022)
Date Decided
2026-10-19
Docket No.
3:26-cv-07389
Status
Unreported
Topics
civil rights, prisoner litigation, Eighth Amendment, conditions of confinement, First Amendment retaliation, screening, service of process

Background

Michael Charles Camou, a prisoner at the Correctional Training Facility (CTF), filed a pro se civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking damages. He alleged that the CTF warden, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and two associate wardens violated the Eighth Amendment by housing him in an unconstitutionally small cell. He also named two correctional officers, alleging they retaliated against him because he filed a grievance and declined to accept a cellmate, by threatening him, forcing him to accept a cellmate, and filing false rules violation reports (RVRs). The case was related to McKenzie v. Borla, No. 25-cv-02820-TLT, which raises similar or identical allegations.

The court reviewed the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires it to identify cognizable claims and dismiss those that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim, or seek damages from immune defendants. Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, and a complaint must contain enough facts to state a plausible claim. A § 1983 plaintiff must allege a violation of federal rights by a person acting under color of state law. The court also recited that leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires, though it may be denied for reasons such as futility.

The Court’s Holding

The court found that, liberally construed, the complaint states an Eighth Amendment claim for inadequate living space against Warden Edward Borla, Secretary Jeffrey Macomber, and Associate Wardens N. Gonzalez and C. Freeman. It cited Rhodes v. Chapman for the principle that prisons need not be comfortable but must provide the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities. This is a screening determination on the plaintiff's allegations. The court made no finding that the cell was in fact unconstitutionally small, and the defendants have not yet answered.

The court concluded that the retaliation allegations against Officers J. Rivera Adame and Steven Magana fail to state a claim under the five-element test of Rhodes v. Robinson. It reasoned that the only threats alleged were further RVRs for refusing a cellmate. The RVR documents the plaintiff attached reflect discipline for refusing a cellmate despite prison policy directing him to accept one, not for his initial grievance. In the court's view, the purpose of those actions was to encourage acceptance of a cellmate rather than to chill protected conduct. The plaintiff also did not allege that his First Amendment rights were chilled or identify what actions beyond RVRs made up the alleged campaign of retaliation.

The retaliation claims were dismissed with leave to amend, so this is not a final judgment, although the order sets no amendment deadline. The court ordered service through CDCR's e-service program on the four remaining defendants. CDCR must return a waiver report within 40 days of e-service of the order. If service is waived, an answer is due 60 days after CDCR provides the report to the Attorney General's Office. The order also notes that briefing is currently stayed under the order relating cases, and that no answer is due while the case is stayed under the bellwether order.

Key Takeaways

  • At § 1915A screening, a pro se prisoner complaint is liberally construed, and an Eighth Amendment inadequate-cell-space claim can proceed against the officials named as responsible.
  • A First Amendment retaliation claim requires facts showing that the adverse action occurred because of protected conduct, chilled the prisoner's rights, and did not advance a legitimate correctional goal.
  • On the facts alleged, discipline tied to refusing a cellmate under prison policy, rather than to a grievance, did not support a retaliation claim at this stage.
  • A prisoner who amends should plead how the conduct chilled his First Amendment rights and identify retaliatory actions beyond RVRs.
  • Passing screening is not a merits ruling. Defendants may still respond, and the order does not decide whether the cell conditions are unconstitutional.

Why It Matters

The order shows how screening can split a prisoner's complaint. A conditions claim naming supervisory officials went forward on a liberal reading, while the retaliation theory failed because the pleaded facts pointed to enforcement of a housing policy rather than punishment for a grievance. The ruling is a short unpublished screening order in the Northern District of California and carries little precedential weight, but it reflects how the court applies the Rhodes v. Robinson elements.

Practically, the case now moves to service on the four supervisory defendants while it remains subject to the stay in the related McKenzie litigation. The two officers are out of the case unless the plaintiff files an amended complaint that cures the identified gaps.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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