Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Pro se plaintiff Don Lee Bucknor filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Contra Costa County, District Attorney Diana Becton, Deputy District Attorney Daniela Maldonado (collectively, the “County Defendants”), state court judges Leonard E. Marquez and Peter Chang (the “State Court Defendants”), and private citizens Mariyam Yonas Rufael and Yonas Rufael. Bucknor alleged that defendants deprived him of custody of his minor child in violation of his constitutional rights. The court issued an order to show cause (Dkt.
No. 6) questioning whether the case should be dismissed under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts from reviewing state court child custody determinations. Bucknor filed an amended complaint (Dkt. No. 9) identical to the original and a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 8).
The Court’s Holding
The court granted Bucknor’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis. It dismissed the amended complaint without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The court held that Bucknor’s claims—that the family court improperly assumed jurisdiction, denied evidentiary hearings, and ignored Child and Family Services recommendations—constitute a de facto appeal of state court legal errors, which federal district courts cannot hear. Further, Bucknor’s claims against the County Defendants and the Rufaels (alleging they mischaracterized him as a threat) are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s custody determination because they depend on a finding that the state court erred in placing the child with Mariyam Rufael. The court granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint by October 30, 2026, limited to claims of misconduct by non-judicial actors (e.g., fraud on the court) that do not challenge the legal correctness of the state court’s rulings.
Key Takeaways
- The Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction over claims that are effectively appeals of state court child custody judgments.
- Claims against non-judicial defendants are dismissed as “inextricably intertwined” if they require a finding that the state court wrongly decided the custody issues.
- A plaintiff may pursue claims alleging that third parties defrauded the state court or engaged in independent misconduct, provided those claims do not seek relief from the state court’s legal rulings.
- The court granted in forma pauperis status but warned of potential additional defects in any amended complaint beyond jurisdiction.
- Any Second Amended Complaint must be complete in itself and cannot incorporate prior pleadings by reference.
Why It Matters
This order applies Ninth Circuit precedent (Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141 (2025)) to a pro se § 1983 action challenging a child custody determination. It clarifies the boundary between impermissible de facto appeals of state court family law orders and permissible independent claims alleging fraud or misconduct by adverse parties in state proceedings. The ruling underscores that even claims for monetary damages against private actors and prosecutors are jurisdictionally barred when they are contingent on overturning a state court custody decision.
The court’s willingness to allow amendment reflects the liberal amendment standard for pro se litigants but imposes a strict jurisdictional filter. The procedural posture matters as much as the doctrine. The court did not finally resolve every claim or factual dispute; it addressed the particular motion before it and specified what could happen next. Counsel should therefore read the relief, amendment opportunity, and stated deadline together with the legal analysis rather than treating the order as a final merits judgment.