Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Ashley Nicole Marie Howse filed an Emergency Motion for Immediate Return of Child and an application to proceed in forma pauperis on September 28, 2026. She invoked the Indian Child Welfare Act and alleged that her newborn Indian child had been unlawfully taken on January 8, 2022, and placed with the child's paternal grandmother after defendants allegedly found that she had endangered the child during pregnancy. She filed on behalf of herself and the child and sought, among other relief, the child's return. These were allegations and requested relief, not findings that the removal was unlawful.
The next day, the court postponed a ruling on the IFP request and gave Howse 30 days to obtain counsel for her child or supply more information. It explained that she could not litigate pro se on the child's behalf and had not explained an ICWA violation. On October 1, the court separately ordered her to show cause in writing why the action should not be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, warning that failure to respond by October 22 could result in dismissal without prejudice. Howse filed neither a response nor a complaint. Instead, she submitted another ex parte motion on October 27, alleging that defendants acted with "evil motive, ill will, and malice."
The Court’s Holding
Judge Sunshine S. Sykes dismissed the action without prejudice for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Applying the presumption that a cause lies outside federal limited jurisdiction unless the party invoking it establishes otherwise, the court first held that Howse's failure to file a complaint, despite being ordered to do so, left no properly commenced civil action. Her motions and requests could not substitute for a complaint.
Second, the ICWA did not supply jurisdiction on the showing made. The court explained that 25 U.S.C. § 1914 required a complaint identifying how the alleged conduct violated 25 U.S.C. §§ 1911, 1912, or 1913. Howse had not made that showing, and her conclusory accusation of evil motive, ill will, and malice was insufficient. Third, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction over any remaining non-ICWA allegations challenging the dependency proceeding. Relying on Rooker-Feldman and Younger principles, it stated that it had no role in interfering with an ongoing state dependency action or reviewing a final state-court decision concerning parental rights.
The court also denied the in forma pauperis application at docket number 3. It noted that Howse had not demonstrated an inability to pay the filing fee, but characterized the application as moot because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The order did not adjudicate whether the child's removal was lawful or decide the underlying custody or parental-rights dispute.
Key Takeaways
- A federal action generally cannot be commenced through an emergency motion or request when the plaintiff has not filed the required civil complaint.
- An ICWA jurisdictional showing under § 1914 must identify a violation of § 1911, § 1912, or § 1913; conclusory allegations of malice do not satisfy that requirement.
- The court treated both Rooker-Feldman and Younger principles as barring federal interference with ongoing state dependency proceedings or review of final state-court parental-rights decisions.
- Dismissal was without prejudice and rested on subject-matter jurisdiction, not a merits determination about the child's removal or placement.
- The fee application was denied and described as moot after the jurisdictional dismissal, although the court also noted that inability to pay had not been demonstrated.
Why It Matters
The decision illustrates the distinct procedural requirements facing a self-represented parent who seeks federal intervention in a child-custody or dependency matter. Even urgent requests for a child's return do not eliminate the need for a complaint, a specific statutory basis for federal jurisdiction, and compliance with orders giving an opportunity to cure jurisdictional deficiencies. Here, the court gave Howse repeated chances to establish jurisdiction, including a written show-cause order with an October 22, 2026 deadline, before dismissing.
The ruling also separates access to federal court from the merits of the underlying family dispute. The court did not validate or invalidate the removal; it concluded that the filing before it did not establish federal jurisdiction and that the remaining dependency challenges were outside its role. Because dismissal was without prejudice, the order itself did not impose a merits judgment on the custody allegations.