California Case Summaries

A.G. v. County of Tulare — Plaintiff’s Pre-Answer Notice Validly Dismisses One Defendant With Prejudice as to Her Claims Only

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
A.G., et al. v. County of Tulare, et al.
Court
U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
Judge
Erin Guy Castillo (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, 2026)
Date Decided
2026-10-14
Docket No.
1:23-cv-00500
Status
Unreported
Topics
civil procedure, voluntary dismissal, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i), notice of dismissal, multi-defendant litigation, termination of defendant

Background

This order comes from a multi-plaintiff civil action against the County of Tulare and other defendants in the Eastern District of California. On October 13, 2026, Plaintiff Rosa Madrid filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of her claims against Defendant Alla Liberstein, stating that the dismissal was with prejudice and applied to Madrid's claims only. The notice appears on the docket as Doc. 111.

According to the order, Liberstein had not served either an answer or a motion for summary judgment responding to Madrid's First Amended Complaint when the notice was filed. The assigned magistrate judge therefore treated the filing as a notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(i), which lets a plaintiff dismiss without a court order before the opposing party answers or moves for summary judgment. The order issued on October 14, 2026, one day after the notice, and it resolves no disputed question of liability.

The Court’s Holding

The court concluded that Madrid validly dismissed her claims against Liberstein, and only those claims, with prejudice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i). It relied on Constantinides v. Los Angeles County Sheriff, 955 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1992), which recognized that a plaintiff could still dismiss defendants who had neither answered nor moved for summary judgment even though another defendant had answered. The court also cited two district court decisions and a federal practice treatise stating that the answer to that question is yes.

Citing Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493 (9th Cir. 1995), the court explained that a notice of voluntary dismissal automatically terminates the action as to the defendants who are its subjects. It then directed the Clerk of Court to terminate Liberstein as a defendant as it pertains to Madrid's complaint only.

The court ordered that the case remain open pending resolution of Madrid's case against all remaining defendants and the remaining complaint by other plaintiffs. The order does not decide the merits of any claim and does not purport to affect the claims of the other plaintiffs.

Key Takeaways

  • A plaintiff may dismiss claims against a particular defendant by notice under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) if that defendant has not yet served an answer or a motion for summary judgment, even when other defendants have already answered.
  • The notice itself ends the claims against the named defendant; the court's order directing the Clerk to terminate the defendant reflects that result on the docket rather than granting permission.
  • Here the dismissal was stated to be with prejudice and was limited to one plaintiff's claims against one defendant, so the other plaintiffs and the other defendants are unaffected.
  • The case stays open for Madrid's claims against the remaining defendants and for the claims of the other plaintiffs.
  • Because this is an unreported magistrate judge order resolving a docket housekeeping matter, it carries no precedential weight and mainly shows how the court applied settled authority.

Why It Matters

The order is a short, routine application of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) in a multi-party case, but it addresses a question that recurs: whether a plaintiff can still dismiss by notice a defendant who has not answered when a co-defendant already has. The court, following Constantinides and the other authorities it cites, said yes. Practitioners can treat it only as an illustration, since it is not a published or precedential decision.

The order also shows the importance of the notice's scope. The dismissal reached only Madrid's claims against Liberstein, and the court confined the termination of Liberstein to Madrid's complaint. Because the notice specified dismissal with prejudice, the order treats those claims as dismissed on that basis, though it does not analyze the preclusive consequences. Anyone following the case should watch for further proceedings involving the remaining defendants and the other plaintiffs' complaint.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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