Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Richard Tristan sued his former employer, the County of Los Angeles, and his former union, AFSCME Local 685, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that both defendants violated his First Amendment rights under Janus v. AFSCME, Council 31, by deducting union dues from his pay without his consent. The Central District of California dismissed the suit for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and Tristan appealed. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo, so the complaint's assertions were treated as allegations, not established facts.
The panel decided the case without oral argument and issued a nonprecedential memorandum. California Government Code sections 1157.3 and 1157.12 direct public employers to honor employee authorizations and to rely on certifications from the employee organization requesting a deduction. They permit a request for verification only when a dispute arises. Tristan argued that Lindke v. Freed had overruled earlier Ninth Circuit union state-action decisions. He also argued that the County had to follow additional procedures before withholding dues, relying on Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.
The Court’s Holding
The court affirmed the dismissal of the claim against the Union because no state action was shown. Applying the two-part test from Wright v. SEIU Local 503, it found neither the state-policy requirement nor the state-actor requirement met. On state policy, Tristan's claim that the Union took his money without consent described a private misuse of the California statute. Under Wright, that misuse is contrary to state law, not the exercise of a right or privilege the State created. On state action, the panel rejected all four tests. Joint action failed because the government's role was at most ministerial payroll processing. Public function failed because collecting dues is not traditionally and exclusively governmental. Governmental nexus failed because regulation and funding are not enough. State compulsion failed because no government actor forced the Union to take his wages. The panel also held that Lindke, which addresses when officials' online posts are official action, is not clearly irreconcilable with Wright and Belgau v. Inslee, so those decisions still bind.
The court likewise affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the County. Tristan had to show a direct causal link between a county policy and the alleged deprivation, plus deliberate indifference. California law required the County to rely on the Union's certification absent a dispute. Tristan never alleged that the County knew or had reason to know he had revoked his authorization or that the Union's representations were false. The County therefore had no real alternative, and its compliance was not a deliberate choice. The panel added that public employers have no affirmative constitutional duty after Janus to ensure that membership agreements and dues deductions are genuine. It noted that Tristan's initial authorization was voluntary and that Hudson, which involved involuntary pre-Janus dues, is inapposite.
The disposition is a bare affirmance. The memorandum does not discuss leave to amend and orders no further proceedings.
Key Takeaways
- Under Wright, a union's alleged collection of dues without valid consent is a private misuse of a state statute, not conduct under state policy, and so does not establish state action.
- Lindke v. Freed, a decision about officials' online posts, does not displace the Ninth Circuit's Wright and Belgau decisions on union dues deductions.
- A Monell claim fails where state law leaves the county no discretion to depart from the challenged procedure and the complaint does not allege that the county knew the union's certification was false.
- The Ninth Circuit again held that Janus does not require public employers to verify the genuineness of dues authorizations, and it distinguished Hudson as a pre-Janus involuntary-dues case.
- Because the memorandum is unpublished, it is not precedent except as Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 allows.
Why It Matters
This memorandum applies published Ninth Circuit authority (Wright, Belgau and Ochoa) to a new argument that Lindke changed the state-action analysis. It treats that argument under the clearly irreconcilable standard of Miller v. Gammie and rejects it. Because it is unpublished, it carries no precedential weight. It is useful mainly as a sign of how a panel would handle similar post-Lindke challenges to dues deductions.
The ruling decides only the pleading-stage claims against the Union and the County. It does not address state-law remedies against a union. It also does not decide what a county must do once a concrete dispute over an authorization has actually been raised, which the California statute treats separately.