Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Samnang Touch, a mobile diesel technician for a Cox Automotive subsidiary in California, sued Cox Automotive Corporate Services, LLC (Cox Corp) and Cox Automotive Mobility Solutions (Cox Mobility) in state court. He alleged that their wage statements violated Labor Code section 226(a) by omitting accurate hours and overtime rates and by not naming the correct legal entity of the employer. A separate Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA) action sought civil penalties for the same alleged violations. The cases were consolidated and removed to federal court.
The parties settled the hours and pay-rate claims, including class claims, and the court approved that settlement. Only the section 226(a)(8) claim remained, which requires a wage statement to show the name and address of the legal entity that is the employer. It was undisputed that Cox Corp appeared on Touch's paystubs and that this Delaware company was not registered to do business in California until 2024. Touch argued there was confusion among four possible Cox entities and that an unregistered company could not be the correct legal entity. Defendants asserted that Cox Mobility is defunct with no employees. They moved for partial summary judgment, and briefing on class certification was delayed pending that ruling.
The Court’s Holding
Chief District Judge Troy L. Nunley granted Defendants' partial summary judgment motion on the section 226(a)(8) claim and denied class certification as moot. Under the control-based test of Martinez v. Combs, the court found no genuine dispute that Cox Corp was Touch's employer. Defendants' corporate witness stated that Cox Corp controls hiring, firing, pay, evaluations, promotions and workplace safety for Cox entity employees, and Touch did not dispute those points. His unamended complaint, treated as a binding judicial admission, said he was hired by and continues to work for the defendants.
Touch offered no evidence that Cox Mobility controlled his work. His one item, a training transcript listing "Mobility Solutions," was explained by the witness as a functional group designation, and he testified he had never heard of Cox Mobility. Documents mentioning Dickinson Fleet Services and Cox Automotive, Inc. did not help because he showed no control by them and, as nonparties, they cannot be liable in this action.
The court then held that lack of California registration does not make the named employer wrong under the statute. Section 226(a)(8) does not require the registered or complete name; courts ask whether the employee can correctly identify the employer. The paystubs listed "Cox Automotive Corp Svcs., LLC," a slight abbreviation Touch did not claim was confusing. The court read Noori and Savea as fictitious-name cases in which registration was only one factor, and concluded that failure to register does not per se violate section 226(a)(8), though it may violate other laws. It said it was troubled by Defendants' registration and disclosure errors, but those were not claims here. The derivative PAGA claim failed with the underlying claim, and because the remaining claims were settled, the clerk was directed to enter final judgment for Defendants and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- Under this ruling, an employer's failure to register to do business in California does not by itself make its name on a wage statement incorrect under Labor Code section 226(a)(8).
- The inquiry is whether the paystub lets the employee identify the employer and its address, not whether the name matches Secretary of State records exactly.
- A plaintiff who admits working for the named entity and does not dispute its control over pay and conditions cannot create a triable issue merely by asserting confusion about other Cox entities.
- Entities that are not parties cannot be held liable in this action, so doubts about their employer status were immaterial to the motion.
- A PAGA claim based solely on the failed wage-statement claim fails with it.
Why It Matters
The order separates wage-statement accuracy from corporate-registration compliance: section 226(a)(8) protects the employee's ability to identify the employer, and a registration lapse matters under that statute only if it causes real confusion. It also illustrates summary judgment burden-shifting, where unsupported assertions of confusion do not rebut specific evidence of control.
This is an unreported district court order, so it binds no other court and is persuasive at most; the decisions it relies on, such as Mejia, Elliot and Flores, are likewise non-binding. It does not decide what consequences registration failures carry under other laws or whether a paystub with a wrong address would suffice. The result here is final judgment for Defendants and a closed case, with the class certification motion denied as moot.