Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
James Lewis sued the City and County of San Francisco and the San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) on a complaint with more than forty numbered claims arising from his public employment. The claims invoked the ADEA, Title VII, the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the Labor Code, the California Constitution, the Bane Act, the Public Records Act, common law torts, and police orders, charter provisions and civil service rules. Defendants moved to dismiss all claims against SFPD and selected claims against the City. Lewis largely did not oppose and conceded many dismissals.
The court decided the motion without oral argument. The complaint's only presentment allegations concerned the EEOC and the California Civil Rights Department, not a government claim to the City for the tort and Labor Code claims. Defendants asserted, and Lewis did not contest, that those claims accrued by September 6, 2023 and that a government claim was filed on September 3, 2024. The court also judicially noticed an EEOC right-to-sue notice dated March 23, 2024 requiring suit within 90 days. Lewis began this action in March 2025, raised no tolling theory, and asked the court to identify the applicable requirements and curable defects.
The Court’s Holding
The motion was largely granted, with dismissal on leave to amend unless the order says otherwise. Claims against SFPD were dismissed without leave because it is a city department that cannot sue or be sued under the charter, which Lewis acknowledged. Tameny claims (1, 28, 29) were dismissed without leave as barred against governmental entities. Claims 8 and 24 (SFPD General Orders), Claims 39 and 41 (charter provisions, civil service rules, codes of conduct) and Claim 35 (deliberate indifference) were dismissed without leave because no private right of action or independent cause of action was shown or contested.
Tort Claims 12 through 16 and 30 through 33, and Labor Code Claims 2 and 17, were dismissed because the complaint pleaded no facts showing or excusing compliance with claim presentation. The court declined to decide which deadline governs each claim and allowed amendment if Lewis has a good-faith basis. Claims 18, 19, 22, 23 and 25, and Claim 4 insofar as it rests on the ADEA, were dismissed as untimely as pleaded under the 90-day period, with leave to allege tolling or other facts showing timeliness. Defendants did not seek dismissal of FEHA theories, so Claims 4, 42 and 43 remain as FEHA claims, and Lewis may amend Claims 42 and 43 to specify the FEHA violation.
Claims 9, 10, 11, 13, 37 and 38 were dismissed for pleading defects: unspecified FEHA provisions, no identified privacy law, privacy invasion attributed to third parties, no judicial process for abuse of process, no public records request, and no violence or threats for the Bane Act. The order does not bar amendment of these claims. Claim 34 was dismissed with express leave because no disability was pleaded. Claims 3, 5 through 7, 20, 21, 26, 27, 36 and 40 were not challenged and remain. Lewis must file an amended complaint by November 20, 2026, without adding claims beyond the order's scope.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff suing a public entity on tort or Labor Code theories must plead facts showing or excusing timely presentment of a government claim, and an opposition that merely asks the court to identify the deadlines will not cure the omission.
- A claim under the ADEA or Title VII that is filed long after the 90-day right-to-sue window is untimely as pleaded unless the complaint alleges facts supporting equitable tolling.
- Internal police orders, charter provisions, civil service rules and codes of conduct did not support a private claim here, and a free-standing deliberate indifference claim was rejected as not an independent cause of action.
- Dismissal with leave to amend is not a final judgment, and the claims that remain were simply not challenged, so the order does not decide their merits.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished district court order and carries no precedential weight. It is a practical illustration of how a federal court handles a sprawling employment complaint against a city, sorting claims into those that cannot be cured and those that can be repleaded.
The case remains open. Lewis has until November 20, 2026 to file an amended complaint, and the timeliness and presentment questions the court left undecided may return if he alleges new facts.