California Case Summaries

Jamal Foster v. Sysco Los Angeles, Inc. et al — Federal Court Remands Employment Discrimination Case to State Court, Finding No LMRA Preemption

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
Jamal Foster v. Sysco Los Angeles, Inc. et al
Court
U.S. District Court — Central District of California
Judge
Stephen V. Wilson (Ronald Reagan, 1985)
Date Decided
2026-10-19
Docket No.
2:26-cv-06502
Status
Unreported
Topics
labor-employment-law, civil-procedure, litigation

Background

Jamal Foster worked as a Sanitation Technician for Sysco Los Angeles, Inc. starting in January 2022. He alleged that from the beginning of his employment, Sysco and his supervisor, Emmanuel Duran, subjected him to racially motivated harassment and discrimination, including hostile language, denial of workplace privileges, false accusations of poor performance and illegal drug use, and humiliating drug testing procedures. After filing complaints with Human Resources in July 2023 and being placed on medical leave, Foster alleged that Sysco denied his accommodation requests, delayed his return to work, issued backdated disciplinary warnings, and ultimately terminated his employment in December 2024, shortly after he filed another retaliation complaint.

Foster filed suit in California state court in May 2026, asserting sixteen state-law causes of action including violations of the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), various Labor Code provisions, and common law claims. Sysco removed the case to federal court in June 2026, arguing that Foster's claims were completely preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) because they arose from a workplace covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Foster moved to remand the case back to state court and also moved to strike Sysco's affirmative defenses.

The Court’s Holding

The court granted Foster's motion to remand, finding that none of his claims were preempted by the LMRA. Applying the Ninth Circuit's two-step Burnside test, the court first concluded that all of Foster's claims survived step one because they arose solely from state law and did not assert rights that existed only as a result of the CBA. At step two, the court examined whether the claims were substantially dependent on interpretation of the CBA and found they were not. The court emphasized that FEHA claims are consistently held not preempted because they enforce rights defined under state law without reference to any CBA. Similarly, Foster's retaliation, CFRA interference, voting leave, drug testing, unfair competition, and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims all turned on factual questions about the parties' conduct and motivations rather than interpretation of CBA terms.

The court rejected Sysco's argument that references to the CBA's disciplinary framework, just cause standard, attendance policies, and drug testing provisions required preemption. The court noted that Sysco merely catalogued CBA provisions without establishing any actual interpretive dispute over their meaning. The court also denied Foster's request for attorney's fees and costs incurred as a result of removal, finding that Sysco had an objectively reasonable basis for seeking removal even though it was ultimately unsuccessful. Because the court granted the motion to remand, it denied Foster's motion to strike Sysco's affirmative defenses as moot.

Key Takeaways

  • State-law employment discrimination claims under FEHA are not preempted by the LMRA merely because the workplace is covered by a collective bargaining agreement.
  • A defendant's reference to CBA provisions as a defense to state-law claims does not trigger federal preemption if the claims themselves are based on independent state rights.
  • Claims that turn on factual questions about employer conduct and motivation, rather than interpretation of CBA terms, are not substantially dependent on the CBA and therefore not preempted.
  • Merely listing CBA provisions without demonstrating an actual interpretive dispute is insufficient to establish LMRA preemption.
  • A removing party may avoid an award of attorney's fees under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) if it had an objectively reasonable basis for removal, even if removal was ultimately unsuccessful.

Why It Matters

This decision reinforces the Ninth Circuit's established framework for determining when state employment law claims are preempted by the LMRA. It clarifies that the mere presence of a collective bargaining agreement does not automatically federalize state-law discrimination and retaliation claims, and that defendants must identify specific interpretive disputes over CBA terms to establish preemption. The ruling protects employees' ability to pursue state-law remedies in state court even in unionized workplaces.

The decision also provides guidance on the objectively reasonable standard for attorney's fees in removal cases, showing that defendants may avoid fee awards when preemption arguments, though unsuccessful, are not frivolous. This balances the incentive to challenge improper removal against the risk of deterring legitimate jurisdictional arguments.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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