Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Laffon Glymph, proceeding pro se, appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, CompuCom Systems, Inc., and CT Corporation Systems. Glymph alleged that CompuCom violated the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) by interfering with her rights and considering her FMLA leave as a negative factor in her termination. She also asserted a state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) under Washington law. The district court, presided over by Judge John H.
Chun, concluded that Glymph failed to establish genuine disputes of material fact on either claim. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo. This is a nonprecedential Ninth Circuit memorandum. The decision is dated 2026-10-28 and concerns docket 25-1089. The account below is limited to the issues and relief actually resolved in this document; it does not treat allegations as established facts or convert a recommendation into a final district-court judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on all claims. Regarding the FMLA claims, the court held that Glymph failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether CompuCom interfered with, restrained, or denied the exercise of her FMLA rights, or whether her FMLA leave was impermissibly considered as a factor in her termination.
Regarding the IIED claim, the court held that Glymph failed to raise a triable dispute as to whether CompuCom engaged in extreme or outrageous conduct, as required under Washington law. The panel unanimously determined the case was suitable for decision without oral argument.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the employer on FMLA interference and retaliation claims due to the plaintiff’s failure to produce evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact.
- The court applied the standard from Xin Liu v. Amway Corp. for FMLA interference, requiring proof that the employer denied or interfered with protected rights.
- The state law IIED claim failed because the plaintiff did not show conduct meeting Washington’s high bar of ‘extreme and outrageous’ behavior, citing Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n.
- The disposition is a memorandum decision not appropriate for publication and not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
- The panel granted Glymph’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal.
Why It Matters
This unpublished memorandum disposition reinforces the evidentiary burden on plaintiffs opposing summary judgment in FMLA and state law emotional distress cases. It illustrates the application of the Xin Liu framework for FMLA interference claims and the stringent Washington standard for IIED, which requires conduct ‘beyond all possible bounds of decency.’ As a non-precedential decision, its primary significance lies in the specific application of these standards to the facts of Glymph’s case rather than the establishment of new legal principles.
Practitioners should read the ruling for its stated procedural posture and remedy, especially any deadline, burden of proof, or opportunity to amend. The distinction matters: an appellate affirmance or dismissal ends the appeal addressed, a district judge’s order supplies operative relief, and a magistrate judge’s recommendation remains subject to objections and adoption. Because unpublished dispositions and magistrate-judge recommendations have limited procedural force, the result should be used as a practical illustration rather than overstated as a new generally binding rule.