Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Brenna Collin began working for HID Global Corporation as a Product Designer in September 2022 and was promoted several times, eventually to Product Design Manager. Her complaint alleges a pattern of differential treatment by male executives, vice presidents, product managers and product owners, who allegedly excluded her from decision-making, declined meetings with her, and did not engage with her work as they did with male colleagues. She also alleges that she was reprimanded in April 2025 over a company-wide email her supervisor had requested, and that she was fired on a call in April 2026, shortly after returning from medical leave, on stated performance grounds without being given the supporting document.
Collin sued in Alameda County Superior Court in July 2026, alleging discrimination, sexual harassment, wrongful termination and other claims. HID removed the case in August and moved in September to compel arbitration under an agreement she signed before starting work. It was undisputed that the agreement existed, that the Federal Arbitration Act governed it, and that it would cover all her claims absent the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). Collin invoked the EFAA and filed a declaration alleging, among other things, repeated interruption, mocking and dismissive responses from a male stakeholder and others, male direct reports obtaining meetings she could not, and being yelled at in September 2024 and again in early 2025 for suggestions that male counterparts made without such treatment. These are allegations; the court made no findings on them.
The Court’s Holding
The court began with the Federal Arbitration Act's presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements. It then turned to the EFAA, 9 U.S.C. section 402(a), under which, at the plaintiff's election, no predispute arbitration agreement is valid or enforceable in a case that relates to a sexual harassment dispute. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing the EFAA invalidates the agreement. The parties agreed that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc., 187 F.4th 1231 (9th Cir. 2026), controls. The court read Ding to hold that disparate treatment on the basis of sex may form a sexual harassment claim and that a hostile environment can exist even when the conduct is not sexual in nature.
Applying that framework, the court agreed with HID that the complaint as pleaded lacks enough facts to support a sexual harassment claim. It concluded, however, that the instances in Collin's declaration, combined with the complaint's other allegations, may plausibly give rise to such a claim and trigger the EFAA. It therefore granted leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2), gave Collin twenty days to file an amended complaint incorporating those allegations, and denied the motion to compel without prejudice so that HID may renew it after reviewing the amended pleading. The judge added that he is inclined to think the additional facts, if pleaded, will trigger the EFAA, but he did not decide that question. HID's related request for administrative relief from General Order 71 was denied as moot, and the hearing was vacated.
Key Takeaways
- The order is not a ruling that the EFAA applies; it holds only that the current complaint is insufficient and that the declaration's allegations could suffice if pleaded.
- Under Ding as the court read it, sex-based disparate treatment that is not sexual in nature can support a sexual harassment claim for EFAA purposes.
- Facts in an opposition declaration can justify leave to amend rather than an order compelling arbitration, though the plaintiff still bears the burden of showing the EFAA applies.
- Because the denial is without prejudice, HID may renew its motion once Collin files an amended complaint, and the court signaled how it is likely to view the new allegations.
- This is an unreported district court order, so it is persuasive at most and does not bind other courts.
Why It Matters
The order shows how Ding is being applied in the Northern District of California. A plaintiff whose complaint does not yet plead a sexual harassment claim may be allowed to amend to bring the dispute within the EFAA, and a plausible claim of sex-based mistreatment, even without sexual conduct, may be enough to defeat a motion to compel.
Employers should expect courts to look past thin pleadings when a plaintiff offers specific supporting facts. The practical result is a more detailed amended complaint followed by a possible renewed motion to compel. Whether the EFAA ultimately removes the whole case from arbitration, or only the claims related to the harassment dispute, was not addressed here and remains open.