Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Anna Buntjer, a Utah resident, was hired by TalentBurst, a staffing agency incorporated and headquartered in Delaware, to work for Adobe from June 2024 to June 2025. In August 2025 she filed agency charges alleging sex and religious harassment by her supervisor, lower pay than a male colleague, and retaliation. After receiving right-to-sue letters in March 2026, she sued both companies under the Equal Pay Act, Title VII, and California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL). These are allegations; the order resolves none of them.
Her first amended complaint adds allegations of company-wide discrimination in pay, benefits, and promotion, without specific facts beyond her own situation. It proposes an Equal Pay Act collective, a nationwide Title VII class of female employees subjected to systemic discrimination in violation of Title VII, and a UCL class of all women who worked for defendants over four years. TalentBurst moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Adobe moved to strike or narrow the Title VII and UCL class allegations, dismiss the prospective-relief and nonrestitutionary disgorgement requests, and strike a reference to Edward Jones. Adobe did not challenge the individual or Equal Pay Act claims.
The Court’s Holding
Judge P. Casey Pitts held that Buntjer did not meet her burden to establish personal jurisdiction over TalentBurst. General jurisdiction was absent because TalentBurst is at home in Delaware. Purposeful availment was undisputed because TalentBurst advertised dozens of California positions, but Buntjer did not show her claims arise out of or relate to those contacts. She lives in Utah, did not see the listing in California, and offered only an unsupported declaration that her assigned office was in San Jose. The record contradicted it: she told the recruiter she could not work in California, accepted the Lehi, Utah location, her offer identified a hybrid role in Lehi, and her agency charge listed Lehi. Advertising a job viewable anywhere is not enough. Dismissal is without prejudice.
The court held that neither Rule 12(f) nor Rule 23(d)(1)(D) alone permits striking class allegations at the outset: unmeritorious class allegations are not immaterial or impertinent, and Rule 23(d)(1)(D) applies only after the court decides under Rule 23(c)(1) that a class cannot be certified. But it has discretion to make that decision on the pleadings when the complaint fails to make a prima facie showing that Rule 23 can be satisfied or that discovery would substantiate the class. The Title VII class was an impermissible fail-safe class, and Buntjer did not explain how discovery could cure it. The UCL class, covering all women employed by Adobe without geographic limit, was overbroad under the presumption against extraterritoriality recognized in Sullivan v. Oracle, and deciding where each member's claim arose would require individualized proof defeating predominance. The court denied certification on the pleadings and struck the class allegations without prejudice, declining to reach Adobe's other objections.
Buntjer lacks standing for prospective relief because she left Adobe over a year ago and professes no intent to return; a state-law public injunction cannot supply Article III standing. Nonrestitutionary disgorgement is unavailable under the UCL, and the reference to non-party Edward Jones was struck as immaterial and impertinent. The motions were granted with leave to amend, with any amended complaint due within 28 days.
Key Takeaways
- Merely advertising a job that applicants in any state can view does not support specific jurisdiction where the plaintiff did not accept a position in the forum and her claims do not arise from the advertisement.
- In this court's view, Rule 23(d)(1)(D) allows striking class allegations only after a Rule 23(c)(1) ruling, but the court may make that ruling on the pleadings when no prima facie Rule 23 showing is made.
- A class limited to people discriminated against in violation of Title VII is a fail-safe class, and a plaintiff who proposes to redefine it later should explain how.
- A nationwide UCL class invites individualized questions about whether each claim arose in California, which can defeat predominance.
- A former employee with no intent to return lacks standing for prospective relief, and nonrestitutionary disgorgement is unavailable under the UCL.
Why It Matters
This is a district court order, not a final judgment, and it does not decide the merits of any discrimination claim. Because the rulings are with leave to amend, Buntjer may replead, and the individual and Equal Pay Act claims against Adobe remain pending. TalentBurst's alternative arguments were not reached.
The order gives a detailed account of when a federal court may address Rule 23 deficiencies at the pleading stage, and its reading of Rule 23(d)(1)(D) departs from some earlier district decisions. As a single district judge's ruling it is persuasive, not binding.