Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Behring Capital LLC filed a trademark declaratory judgment action on October 20, 2025, seeking a declaration that its registered STAK marks are valid and that no likelihood of confusion exists with Stak Corp.’s marks because the parties operate in distinct industries. Stak Corp. moved for a preliminary injunction on September 29, 2026, seeking to enjoin Behring from offering parking, vehicle charging, and mobility services under the STAK mark, focusing on Behring’s 1901 Franklin Street garage, which Behring describes as a “modern mobility hub” with 635 parking spaces and premium EV charging. Behring began housing its STAK GO fleet at the garage on October 16, 2024, and Stak became aware of Behring’s use of the STAK mark in connection with the garage on October 20, 2024. Stak did not seek a temporary restraining order until October 5, 2026, after the original November 5, 2026 hearing date was vacated and rescheduled to January 14, 2027. Behring separately moved to extend its time to oppose Stak’s preliminary injunction motion.
The Court’s Holding
The court denied Stak’s motion for a temporary restraining order without prejudice to the issuance of a preliminary injunction, finding that Stak’s delay in seeking a TRO weighed against granting emergency relief. Stak waited approximately two years after learning of Behring’s use of the STAK mark and approximately one month after the hearing was rescheduled to file its TRO motion, and failed to explain why waiting until the January 14, 2027 hearing date constituted an emergency when waiting until the original November 5, 2026 date did not. The court granted Behring’s motion to extend time to oppose the preliminary injunction motion, finding good cause under Rule 6(b)(1)(A) and no prejudice to Stak given the denial of the TRO and the unchanged January 14, 2027 hearing date. Behring’s opposition is due November 30, 2026, and Stak’s reply is due December 7, 2026.
Key Takeaways
- A plaintiff’s unexplained delay in seeking a TRO weighs heavily against granting emergency relief, even where a preliminary injunction motion is pending.
- The court found Stak’s approximately two-year delay after learning of Behring’s use, and one-month delay after the hearing was rescheduled, demonstrated a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.
- Stak’s argument that it only learned of public parking in August 2026 was undermined by the record showing Behring’s counsel only stated car leasing was limited to residents, not parking.
- The denial of the TRO was without prejudice to the preliminary injunction motion, which remains scheduled for January 14, 2027.
- Behring’s extension request was granted under the lenient “good cause” standard of Rule 6(b)(1)(A) because it was made before the deadline and Stak showed no prejudice.
Why It Matters
This order illustrates the strict scrutiny courts apply to TRO requests when a party delays in seeking emergency relief despite having knowledge of the allegedly infringing activity. The court’s reliance on precedent holding that even short delays (18 days to one month) can justify denial of a TRO reinforces that the TRO standard requires a genuine emergency. The ruling also demonstrates the interplay between TRO and preliminary injunction practice: denial of a TRO does not resolve the merits of the preliminary injunction motion, and scheduling accommodations (extensions of time) are freely granted when no prejudice results. The case remains pending on the preliminary injunction motion, which will be fully briefed by December 7, 2026 and heard on January 14, 2027. The ruling does not decide whether Stak is likely to prevail on infringement or whether preliminary relief ultimately should issue. It addresses urgency and scheduling only. Trademark litigants seeking emergency relief should document when they learned of the challenged conduct and explain every material delay, because delay can undermine the claimed need for immediate intervention.