Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Muhanuka Fabrice, a citizen of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, sought habeas relief from immigration detention under 28 U.S.C. section 2241. He had pleaded guilty to third-degree criminal sexual conduct in 2024. An immigration judge denied asylum and ordered him removed in May 2026, then denied bond in July based on danger to the community.
Fabrice initially appealed the removal ruling but withdrew that appeal on September 23, 2026. Withdrawal made the removal order final and started the statutory removal period. When the district court ruled five weeks later, Fabrice argued that continued custody violated federal law or the Constitution. The government opposed relief.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Robert S. Huie denied the petition and closed the case. Under 8 U.S.C. section 1231(a), the Attorney General “shall detain” a noncitizen during the 90-day removal period. Because only about five weeks had elapsed since Fabrice’s removal order became final, he remained within that mandatory period.
The court distinguished Zadvydas v. Davis, which construed the authority to detain after the 90-day period. Zadvydas recognizes six months as a presumptively reasonable detention period and, after that point, shifts a burden to the government when the detainee gives good reason to believe removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. The court held that this post-removal-period framework had not yet become relevant. Fabrice supplied no separate basis for concluding that detention during the initial statutory window violated the Constitution or federal law. The ruling did not decide whether a later challenge could succeed if removal were not accomplished.
Key Takeaways
- A final removal order triggers the statutory removal period; here, finality followed withdrawal of the administrative appeal.
- Section 1231(a) mandates detention during the initial 90 days.
- Zadvydas addresses detention beyond that initial period and did not make five weeks of post-final-order custody unlawful.
- The decision denied the present petition, without resolving any future challenge based on a materially longer detention.
Why It Matters
Timing controls many post-order immigration habeas cases. Counsel should identify the exact event that made the removal order final and calculate both the 90-day statutory period and the later six-month Zadvydas benchmark before framing a challenge. This short order also cautions against importing the post-removal reasonableness test into the initial period, while leaving open constitutional or statutory arguments supported by facts other than duration alone.
The sequence of agency events was central. The immigration judge ordered removal in May, but Fabrice’s administrative appeal postponed finality until he withdrew it on September 23. The July bond denial based on danger did not itself begin the section 1231 removal period. Once the order became final, however, section 1231 supplied the governing detention authority. The court did not conduct a new danger assessment and did not rest its decision on Fabrice’s conviction; it relied on the statutory timing and the absence of another demonstrated violation. That distinction can prevent overreading the order. It is not a general approval of indefinite immigration detention, nor a finding that removal will remain reasonably foreseeable. It is a ruling that a duration-based challenge was premature during the initial mandatory window. A later petition would require a new record and the standards applicable at that later time. The clerk was directed to close the case, so no further district-court merits proceedings remained on this petition.