Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
E.G. gave birth to Izaiah W. in December 2011 at age 19. Weeks later, she and Izaiah moved in with her mother, Ruth D., and Ruth's partner, Robin T. In October 2015, Ruth and Robin were appointed Izaiah's guardians with E.G.'s consent. In 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic, E.G. left the eight-year-old with them and moved in with her boyfriend, DeMario G. After an April 2022 disagreement, she limited her contact with the guardians. She married DeMario in December 2022 and had a daughter in January 2023.
In April 2023, E.G. petitioned to terminate the guardianship. The next month, Ruth and Robin petitioned to declare Izaiah free from parental custody and control; the petition also covered his father, but the trial court bifurcated the father's case. At trial in 2024 and 2025, E.G. admitted paying no child support from October 2015 to May 2023 despite working from 2020 to 2022. During the six-month statutory period (September 2022 through February 2023), she had one visit and four calls with Izaiah and sent no letters or cards. She blamed a high-risk pregnancy, medical advice to limit stress, family conflict, and the refusal to allow unsupervised contact, while admitting she worked through her third trimester, planned a wedding, and married in that period.
On June 4, 2025, the trial court issued a final statement of decision finding Ruth and Robin credible and E.G. less credible. It held that the lack of support created a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon, that her five contacts were token efforts, and that pregnancy stress did not rebut the presumption. Finding by clear and convincing evidence that Izaiah had no contact or financial support for over six months, the court granted the petition as to E.G. and freed Izaiah from her custody and control. E.G. appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. Family Code section 7822 allows termination of parental rights where a child is left in another's care for six months without support or communication with intent to abandon, and failure to support or communicate is presumptive evidence of that intent. Because E.G. did not dispute providing no support during the statutory period, the court examined whether her five contacts rebutted the presumption.
The court held substantial evidence supported the finding that E.G. failed to overcome the presumption. A reasonable fact finder could have found that medical advice to limit stress was not truly the cause of her limited contact, since she worked through her third trimester, planned a wedding, and married during the same period. Text messages showed she could contact Ruth and Robin to arrange calls without intolerable stress, and she could have sent cards, letters, or photos without contacting the guardians but chose not to. The court rejected her claims that family conflict and the refusal to permit unsupervised contact caused the limited contact, distinguishing cases where a custodial parent actively prevented contact because E.G. did not contend Ruth and Robin blocked her when she tried.
The court also rejected her argument that her April 2023 petition to terminate the guardianship was inconsistent with abandonment, because it was filed after the statutory period and the statute requires only intent to abandon during that period, not permanently. A reasonable fact finder could have found by clear and convincing evidence that E.G. intended to abandon Izaiah during the statutory period, so the judgment was affirmed.
Key Takeaways
- Failure to provide child support during the six-month statutory period creates a rebuttable presumption of intent to abandon under Family Code section 7822, subdivision (b).
- A parent's claim that pregnancy-related stress limited contact may be rejected where the parent worked, planned a wedding, and married during the same period.
- One visit and four calls over six months, without letters, cards, or support, may be only token efforts insufficient to rebut the presumption.
- Claims that family conflict or a guardian's refusal to allow unsupervised contact caused limited contact fail where the parent does not contend the guardians prevented contact when she tried.
- A guardianship-termination petition filed after the statutory period does not negate clear and convincing evidence of intent to abandon during that period.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision illustrates how California courts apply the section 7822 presumption of intent to abandon when a parent provides no support and makes only minimal contact during the six-month statutory period. Stated reasons for limited contact—medical advice, family conflict, or visitation constraints—may be discounted when the parent's own conduct shows the ability to engage in comparably stressful activities or to communicate by other means.
The opinion also clarifies that post-period efforts to reestablish contact, such as petitioning to terminate a guardianship, do not erase clear and convincing evidence of abandonment during the statutory window, and it reinforces the deferential substantial-evidence review of abandonment findings made under the clear and convincing standard.