Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
The United States filed suit against the City of San Diego and other defendants under CERCLA and related claims.
The parties entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) governing environmental remediation obligations.
The United States asserted a counterclaim for breach of contract under the MOA.
On March 30, 2026, the Court granted the United States’ motion and denied the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on that counterclaim (ECF No. 224).
The City then moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for entry of final judgment on that order and, alternatively, under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) to certify for immediate appeal the question of whether 42 U.S.C. § 9613(j) applies to the United States’ breach-of-contract counterclaim.
The United States opposed, arguing neither standard was met.
The Court’s Holding
The Court denied the City’s motion in full.
Under Rule 54(b), the Court found the breach-of-contract counterclaim and the remaining CERCLA claims constitute a single claim because they arise from the same factual nucleus—the Navy’s performance of its remedial obligations—and the Court’s prior order required analyzing CERCLA compliance to resolve the MOA breach claim.
Certification would cause piecemeal appeals of overlapping issues.
Under § 1292(b), the Court held an immediate appeal would not materially advance the litigation’s termination because the certified question pertains only to the already-adjudicated counterclaim, while the United States’ remaining CERCLA claims are set for trial in less than a month regardless of the appeal’s outcome.
Key Takeaways
- Rule 54(b) certification denied because the breach-of-contract counterclaim and CERCLA claims are factually intertwined and constitute a single claim for appeal purposes.
- The Court’s prior ruling on the counterclaim required determining whether the Navy performed its CERCLA obligations, making the claims inseparable under Ninth Circuit precedent.
- Section 1292(b) certification denied because resolving the statutory-applicability question would not shorten, simplify, or accelerate the impending trial on the remaining CERCLA claims.
- The Court emphasized that § 1292(b) is a narrow exception to the final-judgment rule and must be applied sparingly.
- The case proceeds to trial on the United States’ remaining CERCLA claims within weeks.
Why It Matters
This order reinforces the strong federal policy against piecemeal appeals in complex environmental litigation where contract and statutory claims share a common factual core.
By denying both Rule 54(b) and § 1292(b) certification, the Court ensures that all claims—including the adjudicated breach-of-contract counterclaim and the pending CERCLA claims—will be reviewed together on appeal after final judgment, avoiding duplicative appellate review of overlapping factual and legal issues.
The ruling also clarifies that a purely legal question concerning an already-decided claim does not satisfy § 1292(b)’s ‘materially advance’ requirement when the rest of the case is trial-ready.
The court applied two separate routes for early appellate review.
Rule 54(b) requires a final resolution of a genuinely separate claim and a determination that there is no just reason for delay.
Section 1292(b) requires, among other things, that an immediate appeal materially advance the ultimate termination of the case.
The City failed under both routes because the claims overlapped and trial on the remaining claims was imminent.
The ruling leaves the earlier partial-summary-judgment decision in place and sends the parties toward the scheduled trial, preserving any appellate review for the ordinary appeal after final judgment.