Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Michael Wayne Northcutt, representing himself, appealed from an order of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, Judge Jennifer L. Thurston presiding, that denied his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The appeals arise from two criminal cases carrying separate district court numbers, which the Ninth Circuit consolidated as Nos. 26-980 and 26-1006. The panel found the matter suitable for decision without oral argument, took it as submitted on October 27, 2026, and filed an unpublished memorandum on November 3, 2026.
The memorandum shows that Northcutt argued extraordinary and compelling circumstances existed, relying on Congress's nonretroactive change to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) and on the adequacy of his medical care. He also contended that the district court misapplied Eastern District Local Rule 182. The district court rejected the extraordinary-and-compelling showing and independently held that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not support relief. The memorandum does not describe the underlying offenses beyond calling them violent, nor the sentence or his specific medical conditions. The panel reviewed for abuse of discretion.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding no extraordinary and compelling circumstances. Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Rutherford v. United States, the panel stated that a nonretroactive change to § 924(c), considered by itself or in combination with other factors, cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release. On medical care, the panel concluded that the record supported the district court's finding that Northcutt failed to show his care was so inadequate as to constitute an extraordinary and compelling circumstance under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1).
The panel did not reach the Local Rule 182 argument because the district court considered Northcutt's pro se filings. It then held that any error in the extraordinary-and-compelling analysis was harmless in light of the district court's independent holding that the § 3553(a) factors did not support relief. Although Northcutt pointed to mitigating circumstances, the panel found no abuse of discretion in the district court's conclusion that the violent nature of his offenses, together with his record of misconduct while incarcerated, weighed against relief.
The disposition is limited. The panel affirmed the denial of this motion and granted the government's motion for judicial notice. It ordered no remand, and the memorandum does not address whether Northcutt could bring a later motion.
Key Takeaways
- A nonretroactive change to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release, whether considered alone or combined with other factors, under the Supreme Court's decision in Rutherford v. United States.
- A defendant claiming inadequate medical care must show care so inadequate that it amounts to an extraordinary and compelling circumstance under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(1), and the record here supported the district court's contrary finding.
- An independent district court ruling that the § 3553(a) factors do not support release can render any error in the extraordinary-and-compelling analysis harmless.
- The violent nature of the offenses and a record of misconduct in custody were enough to weigh against relief despite the defendant's claimed mitigating circumstances.
- The Ninth Circuit declined to reach a Local Rule 182 challenge because the district court considered the defendant's pro se filings.
Why It Matters
This is an unpublished, nonprecedential memorandum, citable only as permitted by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3, so its value lies in how the panel applied Rutherford rather than in new law. It shows the Ninth Circuit treating a nonretroactive § 924(c) change as unable to support eligibility even when paired with other factors, and it gives a practical example of how the record is assessed on a medical-care theory.
The decision also shows how durable a denial can be when it rests on two grounds. Because the § 3553(a) holding stood independently and was reviewed deferentially, the panel did not need to resolve every challenge to the first step. Still open are the underlying facts, the sentence, the medical details, and any possibility of a later motion, none of which the memorandum describes.