Reported / Citable
Background
John Chapman drove his on-and-off girlfriend, Jamie Feden, from Pennsylvania to Las Vegas in September 2019 under the cover story of a vacation and a planned camping trip. In the months leading up to the trip, his internet activity included repeated searches and Quora interactions about hiding a body, dissolving flesh in acid, and avoiding charges when no body is found. In a remote desert north of Las Vegas, Chapman zip-tied Feden to a signpost during what he later described as a planned bondage photo shoot, taped over her mouth and then her nose, and left her body in the desert. He was eventually charged with one count of kidnapping resulting in death under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1).
At trial, the defense argued that Chapman’s autism, Tourette’s, OCD, and ADHD impaired his ability to read Feden’s nonverbal cues and that the bondage photo shoot was a tragic mistake. Jury deliberations were turbulent. On day one, the jury sent the trial judge two notes that disclosed a 10-2 split for guilty — notes the judge never disclosed to counsel. On day two, the judge canvassed a holdout juror in open court, told her the testimony she was relying on was “irrelevant,” and instructed her to “surrender that opinion.” Thirty-seven minutes later, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Chapman was convicted, denied post-trial relief, and sentenced.
On appeal, Chapman argued (1) the evidence was insufficient because the federal kidnapping statute’s “holding” element requires physical force, (2) the trial court coerced the verdict, and (3) his Miranda waiver was invalid and his confession involuntary.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit, in a published opinion by Judge Gould, vacated Chapman’s conviction and remanded for a new trial — but on the way it issued two significant holdings on the merits.
1. Federal kidnapping’s “holding” element does not require physical force. Joining the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the panel held for the first time that an individual may be “held” against her will under 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1) through non-physical means, including deception, in inveiglement cases. The court anchored its analysis in Chatwin v. United States, 326 U.S. 455 (1946), which described holding as confinement “through force, fear or deception.” Evidence that Chapman lured Feden to Las Vegas under the deceptive promise of moving in with her after the trip was sufficient for a rational jury to find both the “taking” (by inveiglement and decoy) and “holding” (by continuing deception) elements satisfied. The corresponding jury instruction — that “deception can be sufficient to restrain a person against her will” — was therefore correct.
2. The verdict was impermissibly coerced. Even with both parties conceding coercion, the panel walked through the totality of circumstances. Three independent problems compounded one another: the trial court delivered what the panel treated as an Allen charge while knowing the numerical breakdown of the jury’s votes — “per se coercive” under United States v. Williams, 547 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2008), and Ajiboye; the court’s in-person canvass of the holdout juror told her the evidence she relied on was “irrelevant” and that she would “have to surrender” her opinion; and the jury’s 37-minute return after the charge fit comfortably within Ninth Circuit precedent treating short post-charge deliberations as evidence of coercion. The conviction was vacated and the case remanded for a new trial.
3. The Miranda waiver and confession stand. The panel affirmed denial of Chapman’s motion to suppress. He brought up Miranda himself, signed a written waiver, had prior federal criminal experience, and explained his disabilities to detectives while assuring them he understood. Detective Marks’s comment that the officers would “help you out every way we can” in response to Chapman’s death-penalty question was a routine speculation about cooperation, not a will-overbearing inducement. The confession was voluntary.
Key Takeaways
- The Ninth Circuit now joins the majority of circuits in holding that federal kidnapping’s “holding” element can be satisfied by non-physical means — deception, mental restraint, fear — in inveiglement cases.
- An Allen charge given while the trial judge knows the numerical breakdown of the jury’s votes is per se coercive and requires reversal.
- Telling a holdout juror that her relied-on evidence is “irrelevant” or that she must “surrender” her opinion is coercive when combined with other indicia of pressure.
- A unanimous guilty verdict reached in roughly 30-40 minutes after a coercive supplemental instruction is strong evidence of coercion under Ninth Circuit precedent.
- Routine police statements that “honesty goes a long way” or “we’ll help you out” do not, by themselves, render a confession involuntary — especially where the defendant initiated the discussion of his rights and signed a written waiver.
- An appellate court must rule on sufficiency of the evidence before ordering a new trial, because an evidentiary insufficiency reversal would bar retrial under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Why It Matters
For federal criminal defense and prosecution in the Ninth Circuit — including the four California districts — Chapman resolves a long-open question about the reach of the federal kidnapping statute. Defendants can no longer argue that § 1201(a)(1) categorically requires physical force; deception that “holds” a victim against her will, including continuing dishonesty about a relationship or destination, can support the conviction. Charging decisions in deception-based abduction cases — and in trafficking-adjacent cases that proceed under the kidnapping statute — just got more secure for prosecutors.
For trial judges and trial counsel, the case is an unusually crisp catalogue of what makes an Allen charge unconstitutional. Knowing the numerical split before issuing supplemental instructions is the single most dangerous fact pattern, but the panel also flagged in-person canvasses of holdouts and quick post-charge verdicts as recurring red flags. Defense counsel should preserve objections promptly when the court hints at having seen vote-breakdown notes; prosecutors should affirmatively encourage trial courts to disclose every substantive jury communication on the record before any further instruction issues. The price of getting this wrong, as Chapman shows, is a complete retrial of even the most disturbing case.