Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
David G. Reymundo was convicted in 1997 of first-degree residential burglary. The trial court found true allegations that he had two prior strike convictions under the Three Strikes law, two prior serious felony convictions, and three prior prison term enhancements for nonsexually violent offenses. He was sentenced to 13 years plus 25 years to life, including an indeterminate 25-years-to-life term for the burglary, five years for each serious felony prior, and three one-year prior prison term enhancements under former Penal Code section 667.5, subdivision (b).
In 2023, the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation identified Reymundo as a person eligible for relief under Penal Code section 1172.75, which makes legally invalid certain prior prison term enhancements imposed before January 1, 2020. The Fresno County Superior Court appointed counsel on July 31, 2023, and the matter was continued several times over the next two years. On November 21, 2024, the prosecution filed a sentencing brief arguing that Reymundo was ineligible because he had been released from custody on parole.
The trial court's October 29, 2025 written order stated that Reymundo was released from CDCR custody around September 19, 2024, and held that he did not qualify for resentencing because he was not currently serving a term in prison. At a September 3, 2025 hearing, the court took the matter off calendar and in effect denied the motion on the same ground. Reymundo filed a notice of appeal on October 30, 2025.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed. It held that section 1172.75 requires only that the defendant be incarcerated at the beginning of the process, when correctional officials identify persons currently serving a term for a judgment containing a qualifying enhancement. The statute does not require the defendant to remain incarcerated until resentencing to keep eligibility, and resentencing a defendant released on parole is not an empty exercise because it can afford practical relief such as shortening the parole term.
Applying that rule, the court found that Reymundo's judgment included a prior prison term enhancement imposed and executed before January 1, 2020, that was not for a sexually violent offense, and that he was still incarcerated when CDCR identified him in July 2023. His later release on parole during the pendency of the proceedings therefore did not make him ineligible. The People conceded the error, and the court agreed.
The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded with directions to recall Reymundo's sentence and conduct a full resentencing hearing. It expressly stated that it expressed no opinion on whether Reymundo would be entitled to any further relief at the resentencing hearing on remand.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant identified by CDCR as eligible for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.75 does not lose eligibility merely by being released on parole before the resentencing hearing occurs.
- Section 1172.75 requires incarceration at the time CDCR identifies eligible persons, not continued custody through the later resentencing hearing.
- Resentencing a parolee can provide practical relief, including shortening the applicable parole term, so release on parole does not render the resentencing process meaningless.
- Trial courts must recall the sentence and hold a full resentencing hearing for a defendant who was eligible at identification even if parole release occurred during continuances or other delays.
- The Court of Appeal reversed rather than merely recommending relief, and it expressly declined to decide what further relief Reymundo might obtain at the remand hearing.
Why It Matters
The decision applies People v. Rhodius and People v. Washington to confirm that resentencing eligibility under section 1172.75 vests at CDCR identification and is not extinguished by a later parole release. It gives trial courts clear guidance that a defendant's release during the often lengthy gap between identification and hearing cannot by itself justify denying resentencing.
The ruling protects defendants whose resentencing matters are delayed by continuances or other proceedings from losing statutory relief solely because they reached parole before the court acted, while leaving the scope of any sentence reduction for the remand hearing.