Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Obadiah Roberts was convicted in 1986 of first degree murder with a firearm use enhancement and admitted a prior serious felony conviction, resulting in a sentence of 32 years to life in prison. He committed the crime when he was 21 years old. In November 2023, Roberts filed a motion for postconviction discovery in case No. B336346, which the trial court denied. He appealed that order, but the appellate court dismissed his appeal on July 5, 2024.
Meanwhile, on June 21, 2024, Roberts filed in propria persona a motion for a hearing under People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261, which established that youth offenders must have an opportunity to put on the record information relevant to any eventual youth offender parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051. On July 8, 2024, without appearances and without appointing counsel, the trial court denied the motion. The court stated Roberts had not complied with the parameters set forth in In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 regarding his eligibility, and that because the matter was pending appeal in case B336346, the court had no jurisdiction. Roberts appealed the denial of his Franklin motion.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that neither ground cited by the trial court provided a basis to deny the motion. First, the court rejected the jurisdictional rationale. Although the filing of a valid notice of appeal generally vests jurisdiction in the appellate court and divests the trial court of jurisdiction over matters affecting the judgment, appellate jurisdiction does not divest the trial court of all power to act. An appeal stays trial court proceedings only on matters embraced in the matter being appealed. Here, the appeal in case No. B336346 concerned a motion for postconviction discovery, while Franklin proceedings constitute a remedy of evidence preservation unrelated to the validity of the defendant's sentence. Because the Franklin hearing was not embraced in the order on appeal, the trial court retained jurisdiction to hear the motion.
Second, the court held that Roberts's motion was sufficient to initiate Franklin proceedings. The requirements for a Franklin motion are minimal, and the motion need not describe in detail the evidence the youth offender seeks to preserve. Where a motion includes relevant criminal case information and legal authority and establishes eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing, the motion should be granted. Roberts cited sections 1203.01 and 3051 and In re Cook, stated his qualifying age, original case number, controlling offense of murder, requested counsel, said he had never had a Franklin hearing, and asked for an opportunity to make a record of his characteristics as a youth offender. Based on this information, the trial court should have granted the motion. The court expressly declined to opine on whether the trial court must hold a formal Franklin hearing, noting that courts have discretion to determine how to conduct the process efficiently.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court retains jurisdiction to consider a Franklin motion even when an unrelated appeal is pending, because Franklin proceedings are a remedy of evidence preservation that does not affect the judgment or order on appeal.
- The requirements for a Franklin motion are minimal: the motion need only include relevant criminal case information, cite legal authority, and establish eligibility for a youth offender parole hearing.
- A defendant's motion that identifies the original case, relevant law, the defendant's age, sentence, and relief requested is legally sufficient to initiate Franklin proceedings.
- Youth offenders whose convictions are final may move in the trial court for a Franklin hearing under Penal Code section 1203.01 to preserve evidence for eventual parole consideration.
- The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded with directions to appoint counsel for Roberts and to conduct proceedings under Franklin.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that trial courts cannot deny Franklin motions on jurisdictional grounds merely because an unrelated appeal is pending. It clarifies that the scope of appellate divestiture of trial court jurisdiction is limited to matters embraced in the appeal itself, and that evidence-preservation proceedings under Franklin fall outside that scope. The ruling also underscores the minimal showing required to initiate Franklin proceedings, making clear that youth offenders need not provide detailed evidentiary descriptions at the motion stage.
The case is significant for practitioners representing youth offenders seeking to preserve mitigating evidence for eventual parole hearings. It confirms that trial courts should grant legally sufficient Franklin motions and appoint counsel, and that procedural obstacles based on unrelated pending appeals or overly stringent compliance requirements are improper. The decision also leaves open the question of whether a formal hearing is required, preserving trial court discretion on how to conduct the process.