Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 1993, Eriberto Reyna pleaded guilty in Kern County Superior Court to first degree murder under Penal Code sections 187, subdivision (a), and 189, subdivision (a), and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 25 years to life in state prison. The District Attorney's Office had also charged conspiracy to commit murder and conspiracy to commit assault with a deadly weapon, along with enhancements for personal use of a deadly weapon and acting for the benefit of a criminal street gang. Under the plea agreement, Reyna pleaded guilty to count 1, and the remaining counts and enhancements were dismissed.
In April 2024, after his release from prison, Reyna filed a motion to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), alleging that his conviction was invalid because he had not meaningfully understood the adverse immigration consequences of his plea. The trial court granted his request for appointed counsel. In March 2025, defense counsel filed a supplemental motion explaining that Reyna had been released on parole on August 2, 2023, taken into immigration custody the following month, and remained there pending deportation proceedings.
The trial court held a hearing on the motion on August 8, 2025, which Reyna did not attend. Defense counsel represented that Reyna had elected not to contest removal proceedings and had been deported, and counsel elected to proceed with the hearing despite his client's absence.
The Court’s Holding
At the hearing, the People argued that Reyna was ineligible for relief under section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1), because he remained on parole, contending that parole constitutes constructive custody and therefore he did not satisfy the statute's requirement that the moving party be a person who is no longer in criminal custody. They relied on People v. DeJesus (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 1124, 1132, for the proposition that people on parole are not eligible for relief under section 1473.7. The trial court reviewed subpoenaed parole records and confirmed that Reyna had been released on parole in August 2023 for a three-year period. Although defense counsel did not expressly concede the issue, he acknowledged that the People's position was legally compelling and supported by caselaw. The trial court accordingly denied the motion, concluding that Reyna remained on parole, was therefore in constructive criminal custody, and was ineligible for relief.
The trial court also observed that, given Reyna's potential exposure following a conviction at trial and the sentencing and parole benefits of the plea agreement, he might have accepted the agreement even if he understood its adverse immigration consequences; the appellate opinion notes that the record does not indicate the court relied on that observation in denying the motion.
On appeal, Reyna's appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, identifying no error and asking the court to review the record for any reasonably arguable issues. Reyna was afforded an opportunity to submit a supplemental letter or brief but failed to do so in the time allotted. The Court of Appeal conducted its own independent review of the record, found that no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues exist, and affirmed the judgment. The disposition was limited to that affirmance; the opinion did not separately decide the merits of Reyna's immigration-consequences allegation.
Key Takeaways
- The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment after conducting an independent review of the record in response to counsel's Wende brief, finding no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues.
- The trial court's stated basis for denying the motion was Reyna's continued parole and resulting constructive criminal custody, which made him ineligible for relief under section 1473.7 as a person not 'no longer in criminal custody.'
- Reyna's motion alleged that he did not meaningfully understand the adverse immigration consequences of his 1993 guilty plea, but the appellate court did not reach the merits of that allegation.
- The opinion clarifies that the trial court's additional observation about Reyna possibly accepting the plea despite understanding its immigration consequences was not shown to be a basis for the denial.
- Reyna had the opportunity to file a supplemental letter or brief after counsel's Wende brief but did not submit one within the allotted time.
Why It Matters
The decision leaves intact the superior court's custody-based denial of Reyna's postconviction motion. The appellate court's express holding was that independent review disclosed no reasonably arguable factual or legal issues, followed by affirmance of the judgment, so the parole-based ineligibility ruling under section 1473.7 stands undisturbed.
The opinion also distinguishes the trial court's parole rationale from its additional observation about the plea agreement's sentencing and parole benefits. That distinction limits what the record establishes about the basis for the ruling and avoids treating the observation as an independent prejudicial-error finding.