Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In 2001, Randy Real shot and wounded Michael Wright, who testified that Real yelled a gang name before shooting him. A jury convicted Real of attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder, finding true allegations of personal gun use, gang involvement, and personal infliction of great bodily injury. The trial court sentenced Real to 55 years to life in prison. This division affirmed the judgment on direct appeal in 2003.
Real subsequently filed multiple petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, which provides a procedure for defendants convicted under former felony-murder or natural-and-probable-consequences theories to seek relief. His first petition in September 2021 was denied because it was not filed in the appropriate form/format. A second petition filed in April 2022 was denied on December 13, 2022, because the jury had not been instructed on the natural and probable consequences doctrine or aiding and abetting; Real was instead prosecuted as the actual perpetrator. A different panel of this division affirmed that denial in January 2024.
In August 2025, Real filed the form petition at issue here. The trial court denied it on September 19, 2025, stating this was Real's fourth petition for resentencing, yet he alleged no changes in fact or law, and deeming it a duplicate petition. The record on appeal, however, contains only three section 1172.6 petitions. Real appealed, and his appointed counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. Real then filed a supplemental brief arguing that his petition was erroneously denied, that false evidence was admitted at his trial, and that another person confessed to being the actual perpetrator.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the order denying the petition. The court explained that Senate Bill No. 1437 limited accomplice liability under the felony-murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, but did not invalidate convictions based on a theory that the defendant was the actual killer or intended to kill. Senate Bill No. 775 then extended resentencing relief to defendants convicted of attempted murder on a natural and probable consequences theory.
The court held that although section 1172.6 does not expressly bar successive petitions, the doctrine of collateral estoppel may bar a successive petition if there are no changes in law that bring into question a prior ruling. Because Real's current petition cited no change in law that brought into question this court's prior decision in People v. Real, supra, B328619, the trial court properly denied the petition at the prima facie stage.
The court rejected Real's supplemental contentions that evidence at his trial was false and unreliable, including a photo lineup used to identify him, and that another person confessed to attempting to kill Wright. These issues, the court held, are outside the scope of the section 1172.6 inquiry, which does not permit wholesale relitigation of findings supporting murder convictions or afford a new opportunity to raise trial error claims or attack the sufficiency of the evidence.
Key Takeaways
- A trial court may deny a successive section 1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage when the petitioner alleges no changes in fact or law that would bring into question a prior appellate ruling on the same issue.
- Collateral estoppel can bar a successive resentencing petition even though section 1172.6 does not expressly prohibit repeat filings.
- Section 1172.6 does not permit a defendant to relitigate the sufficiency of the evidence, challenge the reliability of trial evidence, or raise claims of trial error.
- Senate Bill 1437 did not invalidate murder or attempted murder convictions based on a theory that the defendant was the actual killer, actual attempted killer, or intended to kill.
- A defendant prosecuted as the actual perpetrator, rather than under a natural and probable consequences or aiding-and-abetting theory, is not entitled to resentencing under section 1172.6.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that section 1172.6 provides a narrow remedy for defendants convicted under specific invalid theories, not a general mechanism for reopening final judgments. Trial courts may efficiently dispose of meritless successive petitions at the prima facie stage when the petitioner identifies no intervening change in law.
The ruling also clarifies the limited scope of the section 1172.6 inquiry, confirming that defendants cannot use the statute to relitigate evidentiary issues or assert claims of actual innocence that fall outside the statutory framework.