California Case Summaries

People v. Perrot — Parolee Detained in County Jail Pending Dismissed Sexually Violent Predator Civil Commitment Proceedings Is Not Entitled to Penal Code Section 4019 Conduct Credits Against Parole Term

Unreported / Non-Citable

Case
People v. Perrot
Court
1st District Court of Appeal
Judge
Streeter, J. (Jerry Brown, 2014); Brown, P. J. (Jerry Brown, 2018); Goldman, J. (Gavin Newsom, 2022)
Date Decided
2026-11-19
Docket No.
A173266
Status
Unreported / Non-Citable
Topics
Penal Code section 4019, conduct credits, Sexually Violent Predator Act, civil commitment, parole revocation, equal protection, statutory interpretation

Background

In June 2004, a Humboldt County jury convicted Shawn Lee Perrot of multiple felony sex offenses against minors, resulting in a 21-year prison sentence. In July 2020, prior to his release from prison, Perrot refused to sign parole conditions. Concurrently, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation initiated Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) civil commitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6601.

Upon his September 2020 prison release, Perrot was transferred to county jail pending adjudication of the SVP proceedings. In April 2022, the SVP petition was dismissed, Perrot signed his parole conditions, and he was released into the community. In April 2025, parole authorities petitioned to revoke parole for unauthorized device and social media activity. Perrot moved to dismiss, arguing that nineteen months spent in jail during the dismissed SVP proceedings generated conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019 that expired his parole term in February 2024. The trial court denied the motion because SVP proceedings are civil, found a violation, and imposed a 120-day jail sanction. Perrot obtained bail pending appeal.

The Court’s Holding

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Writing for Division Four, Justice Streeter held that pre-hearing county jail detention during civil SVP proceedings does not constitute confinement under a judgment of imprisonment or in a criminal proceeding qualifying for Penal Code section 4019 conduct credits. The court rejected Perrot's argument under Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (a)(4)(B), holding that statutory abrogation of parole tolling when an individual is not committed to a state hospital does not recharacterize civil detention into criminal custody or grant conduct credits under section 2900.5.

The court also rejected Perrot's equal protection challenge under People v. Hardin. Because Perrot challenged section 4019 as applied, he bore the threshold burden of showing that he was similarly situated to an identifiable comparator group treated differently. The court held that Perrot failed to identify any comparable group of civil detainees or parolees who receive conduct credits for dismissed holds. Finally, because Perrot was not entitled to statutory or constitutional credits, his parole term remained active, and the trial court retained jurisdiction to impose the 120-day custodial sanction.

Key Takeaways

  • Detention in county jail pending civil Sexually Violent Predator Act proceedings is civil custody that does not qualify for presentence conduct credits under Penal Code section 4019.
  • Penal Code section 3000, subdivision (a)(4)(B) abrogates the tolling of parole when a person is not committed to a state hospital, but it does not retroactively transform civil detention into criminal imprisonment eligible for good conduct credits.
  • Under People v. Hardin, an as-applied equal protection challenge to sentencing or credit statutes requires a threshold showing that the defendant is similarly situated in all material respects to a comparator group receiving more favorable treatment.
  • Because no conduct credits applied to shorten the defendant's parole term, the trial court retained jurisdiction to adjudicate parole violations and impose custodial sanctions.

Why It Matters

This decision clarifies that pre-hearing detention during Sexually Violent Predator Act civil commitment proceedings cannot be converted into criminal presentence custody to accelerate the termination of parole, even when the underlying SVP petition is dismissed without an adjudication of dangerousness.

Read the full opinion (PDF) · Court docket

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