Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
In June 2012, one month past his eighteenth birthday, Alberto Mejia shot and killed two unarmed men on a Los Angeles street. According to facts drawn from the court's prior opinion, Mejia stepped into the street, took time to aim, and fired until he ran out of bullets; he stood over a dying victim, cursed him for belonging to a rival gang, and said he would have shot him in the face with another round. A jury convicted him of two counts of second degree murder and found true a firearm enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.53, subdivision (d), but rejected the gang enhancement. The trial court sentenced him to 80 years to life, imposing 40 years to life for each murder conviction—a base term of 15 years to life plus the 25-year firearm minimum.
On direct appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the convictions but remanded for the trial court to assess whether Mejia had a sufficient opportunity to present evidence of his characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense, as People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 requires. On remand, the court held a hearing on March 27, 2018, at which Mejia was personally present with counsel; the parties stipulated to submitting packets to the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation for future youth offender parole hearings. A minute order dated April 12, 2018 directed the judgment clerk to send the reporter's transcript, the People's statement of view, and defense counsel's packet to CDCR.
On June 25, 2025, Mejia petitioned for a new Franklin proceeding to make a record of youth-related mitigation evidence. The trial court denied the petition the same day, noting the 2018 proceedings had concluded with both parties' materials forwarded to the parole board. Mejia appealed; appointed counsel filed a no-issue brief under People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, and Mejia filed a supplemental letter brief.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed. It rejected Mejia's claim that he was never told his case was finalized or that counsel had been appointed for his Franklin packet, finding the assertion belied by the March 27, 2018 minute order showing Mejia was personally present when his counsel stipulated to submitting both parties' packets to CDCR for future parole hearings, with his own packet submitted that day.
The court also rejected his contention that the Board of Parole Hearings lacked the forwarded documents, based on an August 29, 2025 consultation about a parole hearing scheduled for December 21, 2031. Nothing in the record suggested the Board lacked access; the court invoked the Evidence Code section 664 presumption that official duty is regularly performed—applicable to court clerks—and the presumption that court minutes are correct. Documents possibly absent from a consultation years before a future hearing did not show CDCR lacked the packet.
On the merits, trial courts have discretion to conduct Franklin proceedings efficiently and to deny further proceedings they find unwarranted (People v. Howard (2021) 74 Cal.App.5th 141; People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743). Because the record showed Mejia had the opportunity—and used it—to place evidence in the record in 2018, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the 2025 request.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant who already received a Franklin remand and placed youth-related mitigation evidence in the record is not entitled to a second proceeding; denial of such a request is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
- A minute order showing the defendant was personally present when counsel stipulated to submit mitigation packets to CDCR defeats a claim of unawareness that the matter had concluded.
- The Evidence Code section 664 presumption of regular official duty supports the inference that documents a judgment clerk was directed to forward to CDCR were forwarded and remain accessible.
- Missing Franklin materials at a parole consultation years before a scheduled hearing do not by themselves show CDCR lacks the materials.
- Under Howard and Benzler, trial courts have broad discretion over the manner and extent of Franklin proceedings and may deny further proceedings they find unwarranted.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision shows how California appellate courts handle repeat Franklin requests after a completed remand. The holding is narrower than a categorical one-time rule: trial courts have discretion to deny further proceedings when the record shows a prior opportunity was used. Minute orders proved decisive evidence that Mejia was present and that his mitigation packet was submitted.
The case also illustrates the Delgadillo procedure in practice: when appointed counsel finds no arguable issues, the defendant may file a supplemental brief, but the court independently evaluates those contentions against the record. The court's reliance on the section 664 presumption signals that defendants bear a heavy burden when claiming official records were not transmitted to CDCR or the parole board.