Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
David Howard McClure was prosecuted for multiple drug and firearm offenses arising from a traffic stop by Orange County Sheriff's Deputy Cristian Godinez in the early morning hours of January 24, 2025. Godinez observed McClure's white Toyota Prius parked at a car wash with heavily tinted windows that prevented him from seeing inside the vehicle. After McClure drove away, Godinez initiated a traffic stop based on the tinted front windows, which led to the discovery of a handgun, ammunition, fentanyl, and methamphetamine. The district attorney filed an amended information charging the offenses on May 5, 2025.
McClure moved to suppress the evidence under Penal Code section 1538.5, arguing the traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because Godinez lacked reasonable suspicion that the window tinting was illegal. The trial court denied the motion, finding Godinez had sufficient cause to stop the vehicle based on his observations. McClure then pled guilty as charged and admitted the prior felony conviction and the weight and on-bail enhancements in exchange for a court-indicated sentence of 12 years in prison, also resolving Orange County Superior Court case numbers 23CF1264 and 23CF3008.
At sentencing, the trial court orally imposed a $30 criminal conviction fee and a $40 court operations fee as to each case. However, the abstract of judgment reflected $600 in conviction assessment fees and $800 in court operations assessment fees. McClure appealed, challenging both the denial of his suppression motion and the discrepancy between the oral pronouncement of fees and the abstract of judgment.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, including the denial of McClure's suppression motion, concluding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Godinez had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop. The court distinguished People v. Butler, where a stop based solely on darkened windows observed from a distance at night was deemed insufficient, and instead found the case more analogous to People v. Niebauer and People v. Hanes, where officers provided specific articulable facts beyond merely observing tinted windows.
Godinez testified that he observed the vehicle in a well-lit car wash, looped around the parking lot to view it from all sides, and saw that the front windows were tinted black and so dark that he could not see any occupants inside. The court held these detailed observations provided reasonable suspicion that McClure was violating Vehicle Code section 26708, which prohibits driving with material that obstructs the driver's clear view through the windshield or side windows.
Regarding the abstract of judgment, the court agreed with both McClure and the Attorney General that the fees listed did not match the trial court's oral pronouncement. Following the rule that the oral pronouncement controls when there is a discrepancy, the court directed the trial court to amend the abstract to reflect $90 in Government Code section 30373 fees and $120 in Penal Code section 1465.8 fees, prepare an amended abstract and forward a certified copy to the CDCR, and issue an order directing the CDCR to reimburse McClure any amount exceeding $210 that he had overpaid due to the clerical error.
Key Takeaways
- A traffic stop based on tinted windows is lawful when the officer provides specific articulable facts beyond merely observing darkened glass, such as viewing the vehicle in good lighting from multiple angles and describing the tint as so dark it prevented seeing occupants.
- The Court of Appeal defers to a trial court's factual findings on a suppression motion when supported by substantial evidence, but independently reviews whether the detention was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
- When the abstract of judgment conflicts with the trial court's oral pronouncement of sentence, the oral pronouncement controls and the appellate court may direct the trial court to correct the abstract.
- Vehicle Code section 26708 prohibits driving with any material on the windshield or side windows that obstructs the driver's clear view, with exceptions for rear side windows and certain transparent materials meeting light transmittance requirements.
- Both the defendant and the Attorney General may identify discrepancies between the abstract of judgment and the judgment reflected in the reporter's transcript, and the appellate court may order correction.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that not every observation of tinted windows justifies a traffic stop, but detailed testimony about lighting conditions, viewing angles, and the degree of opacity can establish reasonable suspicion. The ruling provides guidance on what distinguishes a lawful stop from one based on mere speculation, emphasizing the importance of specific, articulable facts.
The case also serves as a reminder that clerical errors in abstracts of judgment can result in defendants being charged fees far exceeding what the trial court actually imposed. The court's direction to the trial court to correct the abstract, forward a certified copy to the CDCR, and order reimbursement demonstrates the importance of ensuring that written records accurately reflect oral pronouncements of sentence.