Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Adrian Kevin Hills, Jr. was charged with multiple felonies after a November 2024 altercation with his then-girlfriend, the victim. Hills entered her apartment through her bedroom window and 'tossed [her] around a little bit' 'all over the house.' The victim called 911; Hills was arrested that same night. Four days later, half an hour before his arraignment, Hills called the victim from jail and said he was taking his case all the way to trial and that she was going, too. She responded, 'I don't want to do any … I don't want any of this. No, I'm cool. I just want you to stay away from me.' He replied, 'Well, then you got to let them know.' At his arraignment he was served with a domestic violence restraining order prohibiting contact with the victim.
Three months later, on the eve of Hills' preliminary hearing, Hills called a mutual friend of his and the victim's and discussed the victim's description of the incident. He said that if the victim was not going to court, 'it's like … I win,' 'She's their only evidence,' and 'It's a matter of time, then this shit go away.' In a letter, Hills wrote that if the victim 'doesn't cooperate or come to court at all I'll be good,' urged the friend to 'just stay away from the situation,' and noted that 'They can also plead the 5th if they happen to show up to court.' The next day Hills called the friend twice more, saying 'Come on, bro. Just do what you can, bro' and 'Shit got to be done, bro.' The friend understood Hills was asking him to reach out to the victim but did not do so on Hills' behalf.
A jury found Hills guilty of attempting to dissuade a witness from testifying (Pen. Code, § 136.1, subd. (a)(2)) and misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 243, subd. (a)(1)), and not guilty of several felonies. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed Hills on formal probation for three years, and sentenced him to 90 days with credit for time served for the misdemeanor. Hills timely appealed.
The Court’s Holding
The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, rejecting Hills' sole challenge that insufficient evidence supported his attempted-dissuasion conviction. The court reviewed the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) prohibits knowingly and maliciously attempting to prevent or dissuade a witness or victim from attending or giving testimony, regardless of whether that attempt is successful. Because the very nature of this crime is solicitation, a defendant may violate the statute by soliciting a third party to convey his wishes to the victim instead of directly conveying those wishes to her himself. The court considers both the dissuading statement itself and the circumstances under which it was made; if the statements are ambiguous but reasonably may be interpreted as intending to dissuade the witness from testifying, the offense has been committed.
Here, Hills repeatedly stressed his need for the victim to avoid testifying or change her story and repeatedly solicited the mutual friend to convince her on his behalf. The context—his statements that the victim was the prosecution's only evidence, his prior encouragement that she 'let them know' she did not want to be involved, and his repeated violence and prior threats to 'ruin' her, have her evicted, and cause her child to be 'taken away'—supported the jury's finding of a knowing and malicious attempt to dissuade. The court also rejected Hills' argument that his statements merely sought retraction: because a defendant may harbor dual intents within more than one statutory provision, evidence of an intent to also persuade the victim to change her testimony does not weaken the evidence supporting the jury's finding. Substantial evidence supports the conviction.
Key Takeaways
- A defendant may violate Penal Code section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) by soliciting a third party to convey his wishes to the victim instead of contacting her directly.
- Ambiguous statements reasonably interpreted as intending to dissuade a witness from testifying can satisfy the offense when viewed with the circumstances.
- Evidence that a defendant also intended to persuade the witness to change her testimony does not weaken evidence of an intent to dissuade her from testifying.
- A defendant's prior violence and threats toward the victim are relevant context for finding knowing and malicious intent.
Why It Matters
This unpublished decision reinforces that witness dissuasion under section 136.1, subdivision (a)(2) reaches indirect attempts through intermediaries and does not require direct contact with the witness, and that courts weigh both the statements and their surrounding circumstances, including prior intimidation.
It also illustrates the dual-intent rule: because a defendant may harbor intents within more than one statutory provision, proof that Hills also wanted the victim to recant did not undermine the substantial evidence of his intent to dissuade her testimony.