Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Following a September 2020 robbery in which a rival gang member taunted the Rollin' 60s Neighborhood Crip Gang by displaying a stolen necklace on social media, gang members gathered at a residence in Los Angeles to plan retaliation. Video surveillance captured codefendant Jalen Perkins contacting Reginald Makyi Hardin, picking him up, and returning to the house. Despite summer temperatures exceeding 100 degrees, Hardin and his three codefendants donned sweatshirts and facial coverings before leaving together in a silver Infiniti.
The vehicle traveled directly to rival territory where Anthony Cudger was transferring his infant daughter into his car. Multiple shooters fired fourteen rounds from three separate firearms, killing Cudger while leaving his infant daughter physically unharmed in the vehicle. Surveillance video tracked the vehicle returning to the initial residence immediately following the attack. During a subsequent undercover jailhouse operation, codefendant Marlon Smith admitted to an informant that Hardin was present, that Hardin 'did it,' and that four individuals shot during the encounter.
At trial, the prosecution introduced a private Instagram message sent by Smith stating he was 'putting shit in the pavement' and referencing the victim. Although the trial court intended to limit the evidence to Smith, it erroneously instructed the jury that the message applied 'as to Mr. Hardin only,' to which defense counsel did not object. Hardin was convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, shooting at an occupied vehicle, and assault with a firearm, with true findings on personal firearm use allegations, resulting in an aggregate prison sentence of 49 years to life.
The Court’s Holding
The Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, holding that the admission of Smith's social media message did not violate Hardin's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights. The court explained that the private message to an acquaintance was nontestimonial under Crawford and did not facially incriminate Hardin. Furthermore, the trial court's misstated limiting instruction constituted harmless error under People v. Watson because the jury received overwhelming independent evidence of guilt, including Smith's unchallenged admissions to the undercover informant, phone records, and surveillance footage, which the prosecutor properly contextualized during closing arguments.
The court also held that substantial circumstantial evidence supported Hardin's convictions for first-degree murder, conspiracy, shooting at an occupied vehicle, assault with a firearm, and the personal firearm use enhancement under Penal Code section 12022.5, subdivision (a). The evidence established motive to retaliate for the gang slight, coordinated planning, flight in disguise, and simultaneous gunfire. Even without direct proof that Hardin saw the infant or fired a specific weapon, he was liable as a coconspirator for the natural and probable consequences of the targeted attack, and Smith's jailhouse admissions regarding the shooting were adequately corroborated by independent physical and digital evidence under Penal Code section 1111.
Key Takeaways
- A codefendant's private social media message to an acquaintance is nontestimonial under the Sixth Amendment and does not trigger Confrontation Clause exclusion.
- An erroneous limiting instruction that mistakenly directs a codefendant's admission against the defendant is subject to state law harmless-error review under Watson where the statement is nontestimonial and lacks facial incrimination.
- Substantial evidence of intent to kill and conspiracy may be established entirely through circumstantial evidence of gang retaliation motives, coordinated planning, disguise, and execution.
- Under conspiracy principles, a defendant who conspires to shoot into an occupied car is criminally liable for assault against all vehicle occupants regardless of whether he personally observed them.
- Slight circumstantial evidence connecting a defendant to the offense suffices to corroborate an accomplice's out-of-court incriminating statements under Penal Code section 1111.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the strict boundaries of the federal Confrontation Clause in multi-defendant criminal proceedings, emphasizing that private electronic communications between acquaintances fall outside the realm of testimonial hearsay even when mistakenly admitted against a non-declarant codefendant.
The ruling also highlights California's deferential substantial evidence standard in gang drive-by prosecutions, illustrating how digital tracking, video surveillance of preparatory disguise, and jailhouse undercover admissions collectively satisfy accomplice corroboration and firearm enhancement standards without direct forensic ballistic matches.