Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Jaime Hector Chavez, a native and citizen of Peru, petitioned for review of two decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The first decision dismissed his appeal from an immigration judge's order finding him statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. The second decision denied his motion for sua sponte reopening of his removal proceedings.
Chavez had previously been convicted under California Penal Code § 273.5(a), which penalizes willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition upon a spouse, former spouse, cohabitant, former cohabitant, or co-parent. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, section 273.5(a) is not categorically a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT) due to overbreadth regarding cohabitants, but is divisible as to the victim-offender relationship. Chavez conceded that the record of conviction was inconclusive regarding his relationship to the victim.
Because his subsequent motion to reopen was time- and number-barred, Chavez sought sua sponte reopening before the BIA. He argued that the Board applied an erroneous legal standard by requiring 'exceptional' rather than 'extraordinary' circumstances, failed to acknowledge that the Department of Homeland Security did not oppose the motion, and misapplied circuit precedent concerning the vacatur of his conviction.
The Court’s Holding
The Ninth Circuit denied both petitions for review. Applying de novo review to whether the conviction constituted a CIMT, the court held that under Pereida v. Wilkinson, an applicant for discretionary relief bears the burden of proving that he was not convicted of a disqualifying criminal offense. Because California Penal Code § 273.5(a) is divisible and the judicially noticeable record was inconclusive under the modified categorical approach, Chavez failed to carry his burden to prove that his historical offense was not a CIMT.
Addressing the motion to reopen, the panel exercised its limited jurisdiction to review for legal or constitutional error under Bonilla v. Lynch. The court held that the BIA did not commit legal error by requiring Chavez to demonstrate 'exceptional circumstances' rather than 'extraordinary circumstances,' as agency and circuit precedent use those terms interchangeably to describe the standard for sua sponte reopening.
The panel also held that the BIA was not required to expressly acknowledge DHS's non-response to the motion. Finally, the court concluded that Chavez's argument regarding Bent v. Garland pertained to an earlier order denying a separate motion to reopen, a petition for review of which Chavez had already withdrawn, leaving that challenge outside the scope of the present review.
Key Takeaways
- Under Pereida v. Wilkinson, an inconclusive criminal record under a divisible statute prevents an applicant from establishing statutory eligibility for cancellation of removal.
- California Penal Code § 273.5(a) is divisible regarding the victim-offender relationship, distinguishing qualifying relationships of trust from non-qualifying cohabitant relationships for CIMT purposes.
- The BIA commits no legal error in describing the standard for sua sponte reopening as requiring 'exceptional circumstances' rather than 'extraordinary circumstances.'
- The BIA is not legally required to expressly acknowledge or discuss the Department of Homeland Security's lack of opposition to a motion to reopen.
- Appellate review of BIA sua sponte reopening decisions is limited to legal or constitutional errors in the specific order under review and does not reach prior orders from withdrawn petitions.
Why It Matters
This decision reaffirms the stringent burden allocation under Pereida v. Wilkinson in the Ninth Circuit, establishing that any evidentiary ambiguity in a state conviction record forecloses discretionary immigration relief when applying the modified categorical approach.
The ruling also confirms the narrow scope of appellate review over BIA sua sponte reopening decisions, clarifying that semantic variations between 'exceptional' and 'extraordinary' circumstances do not constitute reviewable legal error.