Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Sergey Olegovich Vyazhevich entered the United States as a refugee from the U.S.S.R. in 1989 and became a lawful permanent resident. In February 2014, he was ordered removed to Russia after his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and deferral of removal were denied. In March 2014, the Russian Consulate denied travel documents for petitioner, and he was released on an order of supervision. While on supervision, petitioner accumulated additional criminal convictions between 2017 and 2025. On October 21, 2025, ICE re-detained petitioner. The government asserts petitioner refused to complete travel document paperwork on four occasions between March and July 2026, leading to a notice of failure to comply on July 8, 2026. Petitioner does not contest the refusals but states he will continue to refuse because he is not a citizen of Russia and fears removal there. Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on August 3, 2026, after two prior actions in the Middle District of Florida were dismissed without prejudice. The order therefore addresses the present procedural record and does not decide questions the court expressly left for later proceedings.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering petitioner’s immediate release. The court finds that petitioner’s 90-day removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) expired in 2014 and cannot be extended under § 1231(a)(1)(C) based on petitioner’s refusal to complete paperwork in 2026—nearly twelve years after the removal period ended. Following V.R. v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 2026 WL 1965908 (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2026), and Larose v. Blanche, 2026 WL 1346636 (D. Nev. May 14, 2026), the court holds that § 1231(a)(1)(C) does not permit the government to revive an already-expired removal period. As to § 1231(a)(6), petitioner has shown good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal to Russia in the reasonably foreseeable future—Russia denied travel documents in 2014 on the basis that petitioner is not a Russian citizen, and petitioner alleges he is a citizen of the defunct U.S.S.R. and is stateless. The government failed to rebut this showing or provide any evidence of a significant likelihood of removal. Accordingly, petitioner’s continued detention is no longer authorized by statute. The result is limited to the relief and posture described in the order; it should not be read as resolving claims or issues the court did not reach.
Key Takeaways
- A removal period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) that expired in 2014 cannot be extended under § 1231(a)(1)(C) based on a noncitizen’s refusal to cooperate with travel document paperwork in 2026.
- Section 1231(a)(1)(C) does not authorize the government to revive a removal period that has already expired; the triggering conduct must occur during the removal period.
- Under Zadvydas v. Davis, once a noncitizen shows good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must rebut that showing with evidence—which it failed to do here.
- Russia’s 2014 refusal to issue travel documents on the basis that petitioner is not a Russian citizen, combined with petitioner’s uncontested allegations of statelessness (citizen of the U.S.S.R.), supports the finding of no significant likelihood of removal.
- The government’s argument that the 2014 refusal ‘does not control now’ was insufficient without any explanation or evidence that Russia would now issue travel documents.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces the principle established in Zadvydas v. Davis that indefinite immigration detention is unconstitutional when removal is not significantly likely in the reasonably foreseeable future. It aligns with recent decisions in the Eastern District of California (V.R.) and the District of Nevada (Larose) holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(C) cannot be used to extend a removal period that expired years earlier. The ruling underscores that the government bears the burden of rebutting a detainee’s showing of no significant likelihood of removal and cannot rely solely on a noncitizen’s non-cooperation to justify detention long after the statutory removal period has ended. The decision also highlights the practical difficulties of removing individuals to countries that do not recognize them as citizens, particularly where the country of origin (the U.S.S.R.) no longer exists. Practitioners should track the stated deadlines and the precise form of relief, because later proceedings may change the parties’ positions without altering what this order itself decided.