Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Rosalia Arreola Lopez, a citizen of Mexico, has been a lawful permanent resident of the United States since March 27, 1996, and her husband and four children are all U.S. citizens. In 2013, she was convicted of felony welfare fraud and sentenced to 90 days in jail and three years of probation. On February 9, 2026, after a short trip to Mexico, she reentered the country and was detained by officials at Oakland International Airport based on that past conviction. An immigration judge denied her request for a custody redetermination on March 10, 2026, finding a lack of jurisdiction because she was classified as an arriving alien.
Lopez filed a habeas petition and a motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing that detention without a hearing violated the Constitution. Respondents contended she was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because she had committed a crime of moral turpitude, and the court initially denied the TRO, finding she had not shown likely success on her due process claim. After the Monterey County Superior Court reduced her felony to a misdemeanor, Lopez filed an amended petition and a preliminary injunction motion, arguing both that the change undermined the basis for her detention and that her now eight-month detention without a hearing had become unconstitutionally prolonged regardless of its initial validity. Respondents argued only that she had not requested a hearing in immigration court under Matter of Joseph and did not address the prolonged detention claim.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition on the prolonged detention claim, finding that respondents waived any contrary argument by failing to address the issue in their response brief and that Lopez was correct on the merits. The court explained that although the Supreme Court upheld Section 1226(c) against a facial challenge in Demore v. Kim, that ruling does not foreclose as-applied challenges, and due process protections do not disappear simply because mandatory detention is initially permissible. Lopez had a protected liberty interest in freedom from prolonged detention, which the Ninth Circuit has recognized for Section 1226(c) detainees.
Applying the three Mathews v. Eldridge factors, the court found all three weighed in Lopez's favor: her private interest in freedom from imprisonment is fundamental; because Section 1226(c) provides no statutory right to a bond hearing, the risk of erroneous deprivation grows considerable as detention lengthens; and the government's interest is in detaining her without a hearing, not in her continued detention itself, while the cost of providing a hearing is relatively minimal. The court also waived the prudential exhaustion requirement, reasoning that being detained for months without a bond hearing, with several more months likely if she were forced to restart the process in immigration court, constitutes irreparable injury.
The court ordered respondents to provide Lopez a bond hearing before an immigration judge within fourteen days, at which the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denying bond, and the immigration judge should consider her financial circumstances or alternative conditions of release. The clerk was directed to terminate all remaining pending motions and close the case. Because Lopez prevailed on her prolonged detention claim, the court did not address her remaining arguments.
Key Takeaways
- Mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), though facially constitutional under Demore v. Kim, remains subject to as-applied due process challenges when detention becomes unreasonably prolonged.
- A detainee's eight-month detention without any bond hearing established a protected liberty interest and, under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, entitled her to a hearing.
- The government bears the burden at the ordered bond hearing to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is a flight risk or a danger to the community.
- A respondent's failure to address a prolonged detention claim in its opposition brief waives any argument against it.
- The prudential exhaustion requirement may be waived where forcing a detainee to restart proceedings in immigration court would mean months of additional detention, amounting to irreparable injury.
Why It Matters
This decision adds to a growing line of Eastern District of California and Ninth Circuit authority holding that prolonged mandatory immigration detention without a bond hearing violates due process, even where the detention was initially authorized under Section 1226(c). It underscores that Demore's facial validation of the statute does not immunize individual detentions from as-applied constitutional scrutiny as time in custody stretches well beyond the brief periods the Supreme Court contemplated.
The ruling also carries practical lessons for litigants: the government's silence on a prolonged detention theory amounted to waiver, and the court's willingness to excuse prudential exhaustion where further delay would cause irreparable injury lowers a significant barrier for detainees seeking prompt federal court relief. The ordered remedy—a hearing within fourteen days under Singh v. Holder's clear-and-convincing burden on the government—provides a concrete template for relief in similar cases.