Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Hugo Sanchez Ransay, a citizen of Cuba, was paroled into the United States on November 29, 1995. He was ordered removed to Cuba on October 16, 2014, and subsequently released on an order of supervision (OSUP) on May 26, 2015. On December 18, 2025, Ransay was arrested for petit theft and transferred to Department of Homeland Security (DHS) custody on or about December 19, 2025. On February 2, 2026, ICE issued a notice of revocation of release, citing his violation of release conditions (petty theft) and a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. Ransay filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus on September 4, 2026, challenging his continued detention as a violation of due process and applicable regulations. Respondent filed a response on September 30, 2026, arguing the petition was an abuse of the writ and that detention was authorized under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1).
The court addressed the dispute on the record described in the opinion. Allegations are presented as allegations, and the procedural posture controls what the ruling establishes. The result therefore turns on the motion and evidence actually before the court, not on a final resolution of every claim in the underlying litigation overall.
The Court’s Holding
The Magistrate Judge recommends granting the petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. The court found that Petitioner’s detention has exceeded the six-month limit authorized by 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1) for detention following a violation of an order of supervision, as he has been detained for approximately ten months. The court further found that Respondent failed to meet its burden of demonstrating a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, noting Petitioner’s refusal to consent to removal to Mexico and the lack of any identified third country willing to accept him. The court also determined that Petitioner was entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing prior to re-detention due to his accrued liberty interest after nearly ten years on supervision. The motion to appoint counsel was denied as moot in light of the recommended relief.
The magistrate judge recommended immediate release and prospective limits on re-detention. The recommendation remained subject to district-judge review, and objections were due within 14 days.
Key Takeaways
- Detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1) following revocation of an order of supervision is strictly limited to six months; detention beyond that period is unauthorized absent a significant likelihood of removal.
- The government bears the burden of proving a significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future; general assertions of ongoing efforts are insufficient without a specific, willing receiving country.
- A noncitizen’s refusal to consent to removal to a third country (Mexico) negates the reasonable foreseeability of removal under existing agreements.
- Long-term release on an order of supervision creates a protected liberty interest requiring a pre-deprivation hearing before re-detention under Mathews v. Eldridge balancing.
- A prior dismissal without prejudice in another district does not bar a subsequent habeas petition where a fundamental miscarriage of justice would result from dismissal.
Why It Matters
This Findings and Recommendation reinforces the six-month statutory cap on post-revocation detention under 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i)(1) in the Eastern District of California, aligning with recent decisions in Tran, Banos-Jiron, and Pedro V.L. It clarifies that the government cannot rely on speculative third-country removal efforts or a noncitizen’s non-cooperation with removal to Mexico to justify indefinite detention. The ruling also extends due process protections to long-term OSUP holders, requiring a neutral hearing before re-detention. The decision is subject to de novo review by the assigned District Judge upon objection within 14 days.
The opinion is significant but procedurally nonfinal; counsel must track objections and the assigned district judge’s disposition.