Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Mariusz Murek, a 40-year-old native and citizen of Poland, lawfully entered the United States on a B-1/B-2 tourist visa in 2016 and again in February 2017.
He remained in the country after his authorized stay expired, residing in Petaluma, California, with his wife and nine-month-old U.S. citizen son, for whom he is the sole financial support.
He has no criminal history aside from a minor traffic infraction.
On September 20, 2026, ICE detained Murek at San Francisco International Airport while he awaited a domestic flight.
Murek filed a habeas corpus petition and motion for a temporary restraining order, arguing his detention violated his Fifth Amendment due process rights.
Another judge issued a TRO requiring his release and enjoining re-detention without a pre-detention hearing before a neutral decisionmaker.
Murek was released on September 21, 2026.
The parties agreed the Court could rely on the preliminary injunction record to decide the merits of the habeas petition.
The reviewing court therefore addressed the dispute in the posture described above, applying the governing standard to the existing record rather than deciding questions the opinion expressly reserved.
The Court’s Holding
The Court granted the writ of habeas corpus and permanently enjoined the government from re-detaining Murek without first providing a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge with at least seven days’ notice.
The Court held that Murek possesses a protected liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment due to his nearly decade-long residence, family ties, and community connections.
Applying the Mathews v.
Eldridge balancing test, the Court found all three factors favored Murek: his private interest in liberty is substantial; the risk of erroneous deprivation is high because the government offered no evidence he is a flight risk or danger; and the government’s countervailing interest is minimal given his deep ties and clean record.
The Court distinguished Rodriguez Diaz v.
Garland, noting that case addressed a second bond hearing for someone previously unable to show they were not a flight risk, whereas Murek has never had any hearing.
The Court declined to reach Murek’s substantive due process claim.
The injunction is fact-specific.
The court relied on Murek’s long residence, family and community ties, lack of criminal history, and the government’s failure to identify evidence of danger or flight risk.
It required seven days’ notice and placed on the government a clear-and-convincing-evidence burden.
The court expressly did not decide the separate substantive-due-process claim.
Key Takeaways
- Noncitizens with substantial ties to the United States—including long-term residence, family unity, and employment—possess a protected liberty interest under the Fifth Amendment that triggers due process protections prior to immigration detention.
- The Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test requires a pre-detention hearing when the private interest in liberty is high, the risk of erroneous deprivation is significant due to lack of evidence supporting detention, and the government’s interest and administrative burden are minimal.
- Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland does not categorically bar pre-detention hearings for all noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a); it is limited to noncitizens who previously failed to demonstrate they were not a flight risk or danger.
- The government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen is a danger to the community or a flight risk before detention may be imposed.
- The Court’s injunction requires at least seven days’ notice of any bond hearing and does not address detention authority if Murek becomes subject to a final order of removal.
Why It Matters
This decision reinforces that the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause protects noncitizens with deep community ties from warrantless immigration detention without a prior hearing.
By applying Mathews v.
Eldridge to the specific facts of a long-term resident with no criminal history, the Court carved out a due process requirement for pre-detention hearings that exists alongside the post-detention bond hearing framework of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
The ruling clarifies that Rodriguez Diaz does not foreclose such as-applied challenges and emphasizes that the government must justify detention with individualized evidence of flight risk or dangerousness before depriving liberty.
The decision aligns with a growing trend in the Northern and Eastern Districts of California recognizing pre-detention hearing rights for established residents.
For practitioners, the limits of the disposition are as important as its result: the decision controls the identified issue and posture, while leaving reserved questions and further proceedings to the tribunal handling the case.