Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Johnley Conste Menard, a citizen of Haiti, came to the United States in May 2023 and was processed by the Department of Homeland Security and released on Haitian humanitarian parole. The order recounts, from the petition and a government exhibit, that he has a pending Form I-130 petition filed by his United States citizen spouse, along with applications for adjustment of status and employment authorization, and that he has no criminal history.
Menard alleges, and the court treated as background, that on October 2, 2026, he was arrested and re-detained in Florida without prior notice, without an opportunity to be heard, and without any individualized determination of whether re-detention was warranted. He was then transferred to Texas and later to the Imperial Regional Detention Facility in Calexico, California. On October 26, 2026, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, asserting Fifth Amendment due process and Administrative Procedure Act claims.
Respondents acknowledged that Menard had been released on parole but argued that he is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock does not apply to him. They also said they lacked sufficient information about the termination of his parole. Respondents nevertheless acknowledged prior decisions in the district, stated that they do not oppose the petition, and deferred to the court on appropriate relief.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition on due process grounds alone. It announced that it would address only Menard's due process argument, so it did not rule on his Administrative Procedure Act claim or decide whether section 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention or Rodriguez Vazquez applies to him.
Because Menard had previously been released on parole, the court found that he has a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention, reasoning that a decision to release creates an implicit promise that liberty will be revoked only if the person fails to meet the conditions of release. Applying the three Mathews v. Eldridge factors, it found that each favored Menard. His interest in freedom from confinement is significant. The risk of erroneous deprivation is high because his release was revoked without a stated reason or a chance to be heard, nothing in the record suggests that the earlier determination that he was neither dangerous nor a flight risk has changed, and nothing indicates he violated his conditions; notice and a pre-deprivation hearing would therefore have high value. The government's interest in detaining him without notice, reasons, or a hearing is low, and custody hearings in immigration court are routine and impose minimal cost.
The court ordered Respondents to release Menard immediately, subject only to the conditions of his preexisting release. It further ordered that before any re-detention he is entitled to notice of the reasons for revocation and a hearing before a neutral immigration judge, at which the government bears the burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence that he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. The court denied without prejudice his request for attorney's fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act and directed the clerk to enter judgment in his favor and close the case.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen previously released on humanitarian parole may hold a protected liberty interest that bars re-detention without due process.
- The court found that arrest without notice, stated reasons, or a hearing failed all three Mathews factors.
- Relief was immediate release on existing conditions, plus a forward-looking requirement of notice and a hearing before a neutral immigration judge, with the government bearing a clear-and-convincing burden, before any re-detention.
- The ruling is narrow: it left undecided the Administrative Procedure Act claim, the section 1225(b)(2) mandatory detention theory, and the reach of Rodriguez Vazquez.
- Attorney's fees were denied without prejudice, so the request is not foreclosed.
Why It Matters
This is an unreported district court order, so it is persuasive rather than binding. It illustrates how judges in the Southern District of California are applying the Mathews framework to re-detention of people released on parole, relying on earlier decisions from this and other California districts that treat release as creating a liberty interest.
Its practical reach is limited to this petitioner. The order does not decide the statutory mandatory-detention question the government raised, and the government, which did not oppose the petition, deferred to the court on relief. Whether Menard can later be re-detained will turn on the notice-and-hearing procedure the court prescribed.