Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Petitioner Jorge M.C. entered the United States in August 2000 and, according to the order, has lived freely here for twenty-six years with no criminal history. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detained him on August 23, 2026, during a targeted enforcement operation in New Jersey. He alleges that agents approached his vehicle as he was on his way to work, showed him a photograph of the person they were seeking, and arrested him although he was not the person pictured. He was processed on a Notice to Appear, held in New Jersey, and then transferred to California City.
On October 29, 2026, petitioner was granted voluntary departure under safeguards to his country of citizenship and ordered to depart by November 30, 2026. He waived his right to appeal. He filed a habeas petition claiming that his detention violated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause and the Immigration and Nationality Act, and that he had gone nearly three months without an individualized determination of dangerousness or flight risk. He also sought a temporary restraining order. Respondent opposed the petition, arguing the detention was lawful under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and that petitioner 'has the keys to his freedom in his own hands' because he could depart voluntarily.
The Court’s Holding
In an order signed November 16, 2026 by Chief Judge Troy L. Nunley, the court granted the petition on due process grounds. It noted that respondent's opposition did not address the constitutional claim. The court found a protected liberty interest, which petitioner built up over roughly twenty-six years of living freely in the country and which is not lost because he may be removable. It then applied the three-factor test from Mathews v. Eldridge. It found that petitioner's interest may be diminished slightly by his agreement to depart voluntarily, but that the agreement does not extinguish it while he remains here.
On the risk of erroneous deprivation, the court observed that respondent did not argue petitioner is a danger or flight risk, or that detention is needed to carry out the voluntary departure order. It reasoned that the real barrier to departure is his custody, because voluntary departure occurs at the noncitizen's own expense and by his own arrangements, not through ICE, and he cannot make travel arrangements while detained. The court also found the government's interest in withholding procedural protections low, because custody hearings are routine and the burden minimal. It concluded that due process required a hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, which he never received. Having ruled for petitioner on the Fifth Amendment claim, the court did not address his statutory claim.
The court ordered immediate release and a notice of compliance within two court days. It enjoined re-detention while petitioner is subject to § 1226(a) unless there is at least seven days' notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral factfinder. At that hearing the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that its interest in protecting the public or ensuring his appearance outweighs his liberty interest such that no alternative to detention can mitigate the risk, and petitioner may have counsel present. If he becomes subject to a final and executable removal order, respondent must give at least ten days' written notice before detaining him, and that notice may not issue until the order is final and executable. The court denied the restraining order motion as moot and directed entry of judgment and closure of the case.
Key Takeaways
- The court held that a noncitizen detained for nearly three months without any hearing before a neutral decisionmaker was deprived of Fifth Amendment due process under the Mathews balancing test.
- Agreeing to voluntary departure only slightly diminished petitioner's liberty interest and did not extinguish it while he remained in the country.
- Because voluntary departure is arranged and paid for by the noncitizen rather than conducted through ICE, the court found that continued detention impedes the departure the government invoked as a reason to keep him detained.
- The release order bars re-detention under § 1226(a) without seven days' notice and a hearing where the government must show by clear and convincing evidence that no alternative to detention can mitigate danger or flight risk.
- The court did not reach petitioner's statutory claim under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Why It Matters
This is a single district court order that turns on petitioner's specific circumstances: roughly twenty-six years of residence, no criminal history, nearly three months in custody, and a pending voluntary departure order. It does not bind other courts. It shows one judge rejecting the argument that a voluntary departure grant leaves a detainee in control of his own release when custody itself prevents him from arranging travel.
The order also sets detailed conditions on any re-detention, including notice periods, a clear-and-convincing evidentiary burden on the government, and a right to counsel at the hearing. Respondent's failure to address the constitutional claim in its opposition was part of the posture.