Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Fostalyne Ysrael-Calixte, a Haitian national, arrived in the United States in October 2023 seeking asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the Convention Against Torture. As the court recounts the facts, Customs and Border Protection paroled him into the country, he attended every immigration appointment required of him, he submitted an asylum application, and he was later granted employment authorization.
On August 13, 2026, he was arrested on his way to work in Maryland and has been in custody since, now at the Imperial Regional Detention Facility. The court states that no pre-deprivation hearing was held before his re-detention and that he has not received a bond hearing. He petitioned for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on October 20, 2026, asserting claims under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Fourth Amendment. He asked for release or, alternatively, an adequate bond hearing. The court set a briefing schedule and entered a limited stay.
Respondents stated that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), but acknowledged that the court's prior decisions would control the result. They said the government did not oppose the petition and deferred to the court on appropriate relief. They also argued that the court could avoid the constitutional question by ordering a bond hearing.
The Court’s Holding
The court granted the petition, concluding that the revocation of Petitioner's release and his detention violated his due process rights. Citing a prior Southern District of California decision, Noori v. LaRose, it reasoned that he was entitled to written notice, the reasons for terminating his parole, and an opportunity to contest the determination before his parole was terminated. Petitioner contended, and Respondents did not dispute, that he received no individualized determination and no chance to be heard before he was detained.
The court rejected the government's suggestion that it could resolve the case by ordering a bond hearing and so avoid the constitutional question, stating that a due process analysis was necessary. The opinion is brief. It does not separately analyze the § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention position, and it does not address the Administrative Procedure Act or Fourth Amendment claims.
As relief, the court ordered Respondents to release Petitioner immediately under the previously determined conditions. It also enjoined them from re-detaining him without complying with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 and due process. The Clerk was directed to close the matter. The order does not prescribe a bond-hearing procedure and does not grant any other relief.
Key Takeaways
- The court treated Petitioner's prior parole and release as carrying due process protection, requiring written notice, reasons, and an opportunity to contest before the release could be ended and he re-detained.
- The government's non-opposition and its acknowledgment that the court's prior decisions would control shaped the outcome, but the court still made its own due process finding on an undisputed record.
- The court declined to sidestep the constitutional question by ordering only a bond hearing, so the remedy here was release rather than a hearing.
- The injunction bars re-detention unless the government complies with 8 C.F.R. § 212.5 and due process; it does not forbid re-detention outright.
- This is an unpublished district court order, so it is not binding precedent, and it leaves the APA claim, the Fourth Amendment claim, and the § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention question undecided.
Why It Matters
This order applies earlier Southern District of California authority to hold that re-detaining a previously paroled noncitizen without notice, reasons, or a chance to respond violates due process. The analysis is short and rests on facts the government did not dispute, together with the government's decision not to oppose the petition.
Because it is an unpublished district court order resolving a single petition, it has no binding effect beyond the parties and is at most persuasive to other courts. Open questions include how the government's § 1225(b)(2) mandatory-detention position interacts with protections against arbitrary parole termination, and what process would suffice for any future lawful re-detention under § 212.5.