Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Wikenson Hilaire, proceeding without a lawyer, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Eastern District of California on October 29, 2026, challenging his detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Along with the petition, he filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, a motion for a temporary restraining order seeking his immediate release, and a motion to appoint counsel. The court set a briefing schedule and directed the respondent to explain whether anything distinguished the case from several prior decisions in which the court had granted similar relief.
According to the briefing, Hilaire applied for admission at or near San Ysidro, California on June 20, 2023, seeking asylum, and was paroled into the country. He filed an affirmative asylum application with USCIS in July 2023, which the agency closed on April 28, 2025, apparently without an interview on his fear-based claims. After Hilaire was convicted on October 18, 2024, of two counts of leaving the scene of a crash with injury, for which he received six months of probation, ICE re-detained him at his probation officer's office on or about April 22, 2026. The record showed no advance notice or hearing before the re-detention. On October 7, 2026, an immigration judge ordered him removed, but the appeal window remained open until November 6, 2026, so the removal order was not yet final.
The Court’s Holding
The court first rejected the government's argument that Hilaire was subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), noting that the statute by its terms does not apply to noncitizens who have been continuously present in the United States for the two-year period preceding the inadmissibility determination. Because Hilaire had been paroled into the country more than three years earlier and nothing suggested he had not been continuously present, that provision could not authorize his detention. The court also found the 90-day mandatory detention period of 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) inapplicable because his removal order was not yet final.
Turning to the government's reliance on § 1225(b)(2)(A), the court emphasized that the respondent had conceded the case was not substantively distinguishable from prior decisions cited by the court. Given Hilaire's prior release on parole, he was entitled to notice and pre-deprivation process before being re-detained, which he did not receive. Relying on its own precedents holding that re-detention of a previously paroled noncitizen without notice or a pre-detention hearing violates due process, the court granted the petition, ordered Hilaire's immediate release under his prior conditions, and enjoined any future re-detention absent exigent circumstances without notice and a hearing before an immigration judge at which the government bears the burden of proving danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. The in forma pauperis motion was granted, and the temporary restraining order and counsel motions were denied as moot.
Key Takeaways
- A noncitizen who was paroled into the United States and has been continuously present for more than two years is not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1).
- Re-detaining a previously paroled noncitizen without advance notice or a pre-detention hearing violates due process and warrants immediate release on habeas review.
- The 90-day mandatory detention period under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2) does not begin until a removal order becomes final, which had not occurred while the appeal window remained open.
- The government conceded it could not distinguish the court's prior rulings granting relief to similarly situated parolees, effectively resolving the merits.
- Any future re-detention of the petitioner requires notice and a hearing before an immigration judge, with the government bearing the burden of proving danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence.
Why It Matters
This order adds to a growing line of Eastern District of California decisions holding that ICE may not summarily re-detain noncitizens who were previously released on parole without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. It reinforces that parole status carries due process protections that survive until a removal order becomes final.
The decision also illustrates how the court is streamlining these cases: where the government concedes it cannot distinguish controlling prior rulings, the court will rule directly on the merits of the habeas petition rather than awaiting further briefing, and will moot emergency motions by granting full relief.