Unreported / Non-Citable
Background
Jaswinder Singh entered the United States without inspection in January 2024. He was detained, then released on his own recognizance, and he filed an asylum application. He asserts, and the court treats as undisputed, that he has no criminal history. Immigration authorities re-detained him on December 10, 2025, without notice or a hearing. In February 2026 he filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition and a motion for a temporary restraining order, alleging violations of the Immigration and Nationality Act and of his substantive and procedural due process rights. He sought a declaration, release, a permanent injunction against re-detention absent pre-deprivation procedures, and Equal Access to Justice Act fees.
Respondents conceded that nothing materially distinguished the case from Ayala Cajina v. Wofford and did not oppose treating the motion as one for a preliminary injunction. They argued that Singh was an applicant for admission subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(2), and they asked that the petition be held in abeyance. On February 11, 2026, the court granted a preliminary injunction, ordered release on the prior conditions, and barred re-detention absent exigent circumstances without written notice and a pre-detention hearing. The magistrate judge later denied abeyance. Respondents then moved to dismiss all respondents except the immediate custodian and asked that any injunction not bar re-detention after a final removal order. Singh was by then out of custody but argued that the petition was not moot.
The Court’s Holding
The magistrate judge recommends denying the motion to dismiss. Doe v. Garland requires a detainee to name the immediate custodian, but it does not forbid naming others, particularly where the remedy includes an injunction against future re-detention. On the statute, the court relies on the Ninth Circuit's later decision in Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock. That decision held that people present without admission and apprehended in the interior are subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. 1226, with a right to a bond hearing, rather than mandatory detention under 1225(b)(2)(A). Singh had lived in the country almost two years and had been released under section 1226, so detaining him under section 1225(b)(2) without a bond hearing violated the INA.
On due process, the court incorporates its preliminary injunction reasoning. Release on recognizance gave Singh a protected liberty interest, nothing indicates he violated a release condition, and re-detention without a hearing before a neutral adjudicator violated procedural due process. The court rejects respondents' reliance on Thuraissigiam, citing its earlier Ballen-Ramirez decision and the Ninth Circuit's September 2026 decision in Padilla. Padilla treated Thuraissigiam as a case about admission rather than detention and held that noncitizens found away from the border well after arrival are protected from arbitrary detention. The court does not reach the substantive due process claim.
The recommended relief is a grant of the petition on the INA and procedural due process claims and a declaration that the December 2025 re-detention was unlawful. Singh would remain out of custody on his prior conditions. Respondents would be enjoined from re-arresting him without at least seven days' written notice and a pre-deprivation hearing before a neutral fact-finder. There they would bear the burden of showing danger or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence, and Singh could have counsel. The order would not address detention if he becomes subject to an executable final removal order. The petition is not moot because a preliminary injunction gives no permanent protection. Remaining claims would be dismissed without prejudice, and fees denied without prejudice.
Key Takeaways
- Under the Ninth Circuit authority the court applies, a noncitizen who entered without inspection, lived here for an extended period, and was apprehended in the interior is detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a) and is entitled to a bond hearing.
- Release on recognizance can create a protected liberty interest, and re-detention without notice and a hearing before a neutral adjudicator violates procedural due process.
- The court reads Thuraissigiam as a case about admission, not detention, so it does not limit due process protection for people found well inside the country after long presence.
- Release under a preliminary injunction does not moot a petition that seeks permanent protection against re-detention without process.
- Because these are findings and recommendations, none of the proposed relief is in force until the district judge rules.
Why It Matters
This is a magistrate judge's recommendation. It is unreported, not precedential, and not yet adopted by the district judge, and objections were due within three days of service. Its value lies in showing how Eastern District of California judges apply Rodriguez Vazquez and Padilla to the re-detention of people previously released on recognizance. It also shows the specific protections proposed: seven days' notice, a neutral fact-finder, a clear and convincing evidence burden, and counsel.
Several matters remain open. They include whether the district judge adopts the recommendations and what authority governs detention if Singh later becomes subject to an executable final removal order, which the court expressly leaves unaddressed. The substantive due process claim is not decided, and fees may be sought later by a properly supported motion.